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INTRODUCTION
As we all know, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
1
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is about intellectual property (IP).
2
However, TRIPs also contains a smattering of antitrust provisions. Do
these provisions have any normative significance at all? And, if so, what
is it? These questions may be looked at in a number of ways.
First, consider the TRIPs antitrust provisions in an international
antitrust perspective.
While the debate on the desirability of
establishing different types of world antitrust rules is still underway, we
may wish to take stock of the international antitrust rules that are
currently in place. Even though these rules, on the whole, do not
amount to much, they still may possess some attraction for scholars.
This is because they have been around for a while and, thus, may
provide us with some relevant evidence and possibly insights on
whatever next step we may have in mind. In the latter regard, the
competition rules contained in TRIPs are more likely to prove helpful
than, say, the diminutive mini-body of antitrust rules contained in
3
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or the so-called U.N.

1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
2. Throughout this Article, the expressions “antitrust,” “antitrust law,” “competition
law,” and “competition rules” are used synonymously.
3. See Maria Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade and
the Role of the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON THE 50TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 609, 620–621 (1999).
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4

Set because they are somewhat more detailed and comprehensive than
the former and because, in contrast to the latter, they consist of “hard”
rather than “soft” law.
Second, consider the competition law component of TRIPs as
another chapter of the eternally self-renovating tale concerning the
intersection between IP and antitrust. This perspective may also prove
rather interesting. Indeed, the corresponding issues that originally
emerged at the domestic level in the United States or Germany and
subsequently obtained a regional dimension in the European Union
during the last five decades have in the meantime reached the
transnational stage thanks to TRIPs.
While I will not totally ignore these two perspectives, I do not intend
to directly address them either. Rather, I propose to leave them in the
background and, accordingly, concentrate on a different, more
specific—if not unrelated—set of questions:
(1) Is it possible to distill a coherent set of rules from the fragmented
antitrust provisions within TRIPs?
(2) Do these rules imply pro-competitive choices of more general
relevance? And, if so, do they have any impact on the interpretation
and application of other provisions contained in TRIPs?
(3) How wide is the spectrum of TRIPs-compliant, pro-competitive
choices available to Members, and what are the options available under
it?
(4) Does TRIPs contain within its antitrust portions a remedy to the
gradual “ratcheting up” of IP protection that has been taking place in
the last few decades and was decisively reinforced by TRIPs itself?
There is no denying that, by asking these questions, I am making
quite a number of assumptions. The very idea that we are in a phase of
overprotection of IP is theoretically questionable and empirically
disputable. In fact, we should be ready to acknowledge that it is, in
principle, dubious to talk about overprotection—as well as of
underprotection—of IP once we admit that determining the optimal
5
rate of innovation implies a conceptual impossibility. On the other
4. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices, G.A. Res. 35/63, 19 I.L.M. 813 (Dec. 5, 1980) [hereinafter U.N.
Set].
5. Indicated by a literature as diverse as the canonical writing of Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962), and by
the heterodox work of JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
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hand, if we cast aside the theoretical level and try what may be
described as an educated guess on the matter, then one has to concede
that the symmetrically opposite view, according to which we are
6
witnessing a phase of underprotection, has its supporters.
However, my own hunch is in the opposite direction; and, as
disputable as this view may be, I think I should dispense myself from
developing a full argument to support it in order to avoid changing the
subject of this work. Nevertheless, as I ultimately propose to inquire
whether an antidote to IP overprotection is to be found in TRIPs, I
should say something about the assumed “disease” before proceeding to
assess the appropriateness of the proposed “cure.” However, even in
this approach, I will confine myself to just a few remarks.
The reasons ordinarily given to account for the ratcheting up of IP
protection tend to focus on changes in the characteristics of either
technological innovation itself or of the legal process shaping its
regulation.
In the former perspective, it has been argued that in the last few
decades even commercially valuable innovation has shown a tendency
to be incremental rather than discrete while at the same time bearing
7
the very know-how that makes it valuable “on its face.”
Such
innovation, it is argued, may fail to meet the high-access requirements
of patent law and simultaneously turn out to be unprotectable through
trade secret law. The resulting failure of traditional forms of IP
protection is seen as responsible for generating an increased call by
interested circles for the establishment of a variety of mini-monopolies
in the form of hybrid and sui generis regimes, often granting full
exclusivity under attenuated access requirements.
A similar and complementary argument is derived from the
perception that the originally extended trajectory that leads from the
scientific enterprise to its application on the market has collapsed or
shrunk to a bare minimum in areas such as the life sciences and digital
technology. Here, the trend seems to consist of moving IP protection

6. For a specially strident enunciation, see Mickey Cantor, Film Pirates Are Robbing
Us All, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at Ak.
7. As shown in the case of plant varieties, semiconductor chips, databases and even
biotechnology. For a full treatment of this line of thought, see the abundant work of Jerome
H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2432 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hybrids], and Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global
Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279 (2004) [hereinafter Maskus & Reichman,
Globalization].
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upstream and in having it cover disembodied knowledge rather than
tangible material embodiments; and, where this is the case, the resulting
power may be conferred “not only in product markets, but also in
8
innovation markets.”
These technology-focused accounts seem to me complemented
rather than displaced by legal-process scholarship. This latter strand of
literature, in turn, points to a shift in legal change paradigms that
occurred in the final decades of the last century. Indeed, regulatory
competition, inducing sovereigns to engage in a race to the top and to
9
imitate whatever increase in protection is noted in other jurisdictions,
gives a quite straightforward account of the reasons why the dual calls
for hybrid regimes and upstream protection have been heeded rather
than disregarded on either side of the Atlantic and apparently also in
Japan. In turn, the mechanism of “issue linkage” has proved perfectly
apt to persuade even recalcitrant jurisdictions in the periphery to accept,
as a level playing field, whatever high standards of protection have in
the meantime been generated in the center of the world economy by the
workings of regulatory competition.
Having said so much—or, rather, so little—we may turn back to our
original questions. And, in doing so, we should proceed first to an
analysis of the contents and architecture of those TRIPs provisions that
specifically deal with antitrust law.

8. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431, 433 (2004)
(emphasis omitted). In specific connection with the process of extension of protectable
subject matter to disembodied knowledge, see Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual
Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 401, 416–17
(2004).
9. The whole gamut of possible regulatory competition outcomes was encapsulated in
two famous dissenting opinions by Justice Brandeis quite a long time ago. Either the
different competing jurisdictions are seen as laboratories experimenting with diverse legal
rules to strike whatever balance between conflicting interests appears appropriate to the
relevant constituencies, State Ice Corp. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), or, in the alternative, they may engage in a “race of laxity,” Louis K. Liggett Co.
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557–559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), to favor concentrated interests
(typically, business interests) or cut down on the level of protection of dispersed interests
(typically, outside investors’ and consumers’ interests).
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I. TRIPS ANTITRUST PROVISIONS
A. Contents and Architecture
1. The Relevant Provisions
Usually commentators, in identifying TRIPs provisions dealing with
10
antitrust, refer to (a) Articles 40, (b) Article 8(2), and (c) Article 31(k).
I suggest that we go a step beyond by including (d) Article 67 and
11
possibly Article 66(2).
(a) Article 40, as indicated in the title of Part II, section 8 of TRIPs,
entitled “Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual
Licenses,” is confined to the scrutiny of “licensing practices or
12
conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights.” While the final
two paragraphs of this provision deal with procedure (in a manner that
closely parallels paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article IX GATS), the
substantive part of this text is found in its first two paragraphs. The first
paragraph is strikingly philosophical; rather than describing behavior
that may be subject to antitrust scrutiny, it clarifies the rationale under
which the international community may approve of Members’ legal
intervention to restore competition. “Members agree that some
licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property
rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and
13
may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology.” It would
seem that the “appropriate measures to prevent or control such
14
practices,” enabled by the second paragraph, may be in compliance
with the TRIPs provisions insofar that they are intended to reestablish
competition in furtherance of a broad range of goals and that these
include not only the reassertion of competition in itself but also the
preservation of freedom of trade and—remarkably enough—the
15
promotion of the transfer and dissemination of technology.
10. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 404–405; Frederick M. Abbott, Are the Competition
Rules in the WTO TRIPs Agreement Adequate?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 687, 689–91 (2004).
11. Following the proposal made in a brilliant essay by N. Ayse Odman, Using TRIPs
to Make the Innovation Process Work, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 343, 351–54 (2000).
12. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 40(1) (emphasis added).
13. Id.
14. Id. art. 40(2).
15. It should be noted that under Article 40(2), an “adverse effect on competition in
the relevant market” is still required. Id.; see also Ullrich, supra note 8, at 406 n.21 (“The
restrictive nature of a technology transfer agreement is made a necessary connecting factor
for its control, but not a factor determining the outcome of the control.”).
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The second paragraph contains a non-exhaustive list of practices that
16
may be outlawed or controlled by Members’ legislation. The list is
drawn from clauses usually found in patent and know-how licensing
agreements. Nothing prevents its extension to cover trademark and
copyright (or software) licensing—as well as other dealings in
intellectual property—to the extent that these kinds of agreements may
impact trade and technology transfer, even though the history of the
negotiations leading to the signing of TRIPs suggests that the parties
had in mind the more traditional forms of technology transfer
17
agreements. Moreover, Members appear free to opt for per se rules
or, in the alternative, for the resort to the rule of reason or for a
combination of the two, as it is more likely in the context of technology
licensing.
However, the control and prevention are limited to licensing
practices and conditions; therefore, it cannot encompass unilateral
behavior, such as a refusal to deal or discriminatory behavior, even
though it might as well also cover horizontal agreements like reciprocal
licensing or those licensing provisions that are often to be found as
ancillary features in patent pools and in research and development joint
ventures.
(b) For its own part, the provision contained in Article 8(2) is not
subject to any such limitation. “Appropriate measures, provided that
they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be
18
needed” —in the judgment of Members in the process of “formulating
19
or amending their laws and regulations” —“to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
20
transfer of technology.”
There is no question that this provision
enables the prevention and control not only of bilateral and multilateral
dealings—agreements between two or more parties—but also of
unilateral behavior, including refusals to deal and other forms of
exercising IP that may be deemed to constitute abuse.
Once again, as in Article 40(2), measures specifically targeting
16. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 40(2).
17. See supra note 4; see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL
BUSINESS REGULATION 192–95 (2000); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTHSOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 79–106 (1998) (discussing
the aborted Draft International Code of Conduct on Technology Transfer).
18. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
19. See id. art. 8(1).
20. See id. art. 8(2).
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restrictions in international transfer of technology find a special place
here. The disjunctive “or” in Article 8(2) clarifies that adverse impact
on the international transfer of technology may in itself be a sufficient
21
basis for legislation controlling IP abuse or dealings.
Also, this provision makes a clear, specific reference to technology
transfer agreements; but, it does so in order to provide a representative
22
example rather than restrict the scope of its application.
(c) Unilateral anti-competitive behavior may also be prohibited by
Members’ rules that have been adopted in conformity with Article
31(k).
Even more to the point, in connection with practices
“determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti23
competitive,” control measures by Members may be stricter than in all
other situations permitting compulsory licensing of a patent under
Article 31. Specifically, the conditions otherwise set forth in Article
31(b) (prior request to the right holder) and Article 31(f) (limitation of
exploitation of the licensed patent “predominantly for the supply of the
24
domestic market of the Member” resorting to compulsory licensing)
may be waived when anti-competitive behavior by the patentee is
established. Moreover, in an antitrust context and in accordance with
the second sentence of Article 31(k), “[t]he need to correct anticompetitive practices may be taken into account in determining the
25
amount of remuneration,” which should lead to reducing the
remuneration under Article 31(h) to a rate lower than the “adequacy”
26
level otherwise mandated by the same provision.
27
(d) Finally, I subscribe to the view that an antitrust component is
also to be found within the “Transitional Arrangements” of Part VI of

21. A similar point is made by Hanns Ullrich. Ullrich, supra note 8, at 406; see also
Odman, supra note 11, at 348–349.
22. However, the procedural provisions of Article 40(2)–(3) can come into play only in
connection with “licensing.” See Andreas Heinemann, Antitrust Law of Intellectual Property
in the TRIPs Agreement of the World Trade Organization, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS: THE
AGREEEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 239,
247 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); see also Odman, supra note 11, at
350 (indicating that positive comity might come into play here, but only to the extent that the
member state of the IP holder sees fit).
23. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(k).
24. Id. art. 31(f).
25. Id. art. 31(k).
26. On the other hand, I am not sure I can distinguish between the specific compulsory
licensing termination requirements under Article 31(k) and the general rule under Article
31(g).
27. See Odman, supra note 11, at 351–53.
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TRIPs, and more specifically, in the provisions devoted to cooperation
duties of developed member countries towards developing and leastdeveloped member countries. Accordingly, I submit that technical
cooperation under Article 67 extends to the preparation of laws and
regulations on the prevention of abuse of intellectual property rights,
including anti-competitive abuses. It may be argued that Article 66, in
providing that “[d]eveloped country Members shall provide incentives
to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
28
technological base,” also implies that such incentives fully conform to
the duties under the TRIPs only to the extent that they minimize the
29
competition-restrictive features of technology licensing.
2. Antitrust as TRIPs Subject Matter
What is the relevance of the provisions sketched above within the
larger body of TRIPs? Language found in various parts of TRIPs
suggests that the provisions at the intersection of antitrust and IP belong
30
to the “subject matter of TRIPs.”
Thus, Article 3(1), note three,
clearly states that “[f]or the purposes of Articles 3 and 4, ‘protection’ [of
intellectual property] shall include matters affecting the availability,
acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual
property rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual
31
property rights specifically addressed in this Agreement.” It would
appear quite plain that the anti-competitive and abusive practices
discussed above affect the use of intellectual property rights and are
specifically addressed in TRIPs itself; thus, they are to be considered as
TRIPs subject matter for the purposes of Articles 3 and 4. This
conclusion appears confirmed by Article 63, a provision that triggers an
obligation to make certain information publicly available, that is,
transparent. Even there, “the subject matter of this Agreement” is
identified with “the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement and
32
prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights.”
That the mini-body of antitrust within TRIPs belongs to the subject
matter of the Agreement is a conclusion that has a number of

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 66(2).
See Odman, supra note 11, at 345–46, 351–53.
For a similar conclusion, see Odman, supra note 11, at 26, 15.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3(1) n.3 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 63(1) (emphasis added).
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implications. I will come back to one of them below in Part I.B.3. For
the moment, I should remark that one of the consequences of
considering the provisions sketched above as part and parcel of TRIPs is
that the national treatment and most-favored nation treatment clauses
under Articles 3 and 4 apply. This should hardly come as a surprise
because the language of note three specifically addresses the question of
what issues are TRIPs subject matter “[f]or the purposes of Articles 3
33
and 4.” Also, I submit that it does make sense that provisions at the
intersection of antitrust and IP comply both with a negative obligation,
such as the prohibition of discriminations based on nationality
mandated by Article 3, and with a positive obligation as to the
immediate and unconditional extension of “any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any Member to the nationals of any
34
other country” to “the nationals of all other Members.” After all, the
principle whereby all businesses are subject to the same rules in the
marketplace independently of their nationality belongs to the very
essence of competition laws around the world.
So far, I have referred only to the substantive part of the provisions
sketched above in Part I.A.1. Indeed, I do have doubts that one may
draw similar inferences in connection with their procedural parts and in
particular with the establishment and operation of cooperation
agreements in the field of antitrust, even though they may contribute to
35
implementing Articles 40(3) and 40(4).
Building a network of
agreements in the field of antitrust cooperation is a time-consuming
enterprise that experience shows must be tailored to the specifics of the
36
individual countries or groups of countries. Experience also shows that
these networks, once initiated, tend to expand to gradually encompass a
larger number of jurisdictions.
However, an immediate and
unconditional extension under a most-favored nation principle may
prove counterproductive here. Member A, while inclined to experiment
on antitrust cooperation with the authorities of Member B, may retreat
in doubt if identical rules were to be applied automatically in its
relations with all other jurisdictions. Therefore, it is possible to argue

33. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3(1) n.3.
34. Id. art. 4.
35. A similar position is found in Frédéric Jenny, Globalization, Competition and
Trade Policy: Convergence, Divergence and Cooperation, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 315, 317–19, 320–23 (Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo Matsuhita eds.,
2002).
36. See Mario Monti, Cooperation Between Competition Authorities—A Vision for the
Future, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 69, 75.
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that—if we wish to avoid creating disincentives to the conclusion and
gradual extension of cooperation agreements in the field of antitrust—
we should steer clear of applying to them Article 3 and particularly
37
Article 4 of TRIPs.
3. Enabling and Mandatory Features
What do we make out of this set of provisions? It has been noted
that TRIPs “promotes a globally harmonized intellectual property
regime” while leaving “competition policy to the sovereign
determination of Members and their regional economic institutions,”
thereby relying on “a patchwork transnational regime rooted in a
38
multiplicity of national and regional competition laws.” It has also
been remarked that by failing to consider “other potentially anti39
competitive arrangements, including mergers and acquisitions,” TRIPs
40
adopts a narrow focus in designing the antitrust and IP intersection.
I agree with the descriptive part of this analysis. Nevertheless, I
would not subscribe to the conclusions inferred from it and certainly
would not accept that here “expansionist intellectual property
41
protection” interfaces with “reductionist competition rules.”
Indeed, as far as coverage is concerned, TRIPs antitrust provisions
nicely dovetail with what is understood to be the core of classic antitrust
law both in the United States and in the European Union, namely the
prohibition or control of bilateral and unilateral anti-competitive
behavior or, in other words, agreements in restraint of trade and
monopolization (in European parlance, abuse of dominant position). It
is certainly true that mergers are not mentioned at all by TRIPs;
however, this only means that Members’ freedom to institute merger
controls and to take into account IP factors in assessing their
admissibility is unfettered, rather than restricted.
On the other hand, TRIPs also contemplates in Articles 8(2) and

37. A similar argument has been developed by the U.S. delegation at the meeting held
on July 17, 2003. See World Trade Organization, Report (2003) of the Working Group on the
Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/7
(July 17, 2003).
38. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 404.
39. See id. at 405.
40. See id.
41. Notice, however, that the title selected by Ullrich refers to the “reductionist”
character of competition rules not on the basis of their wording and position within TRIPs,
but as a consequence of the more general developments of antitrust law. See Ullrich, supra
note 8, 417–27; see also infra Part II.B.2.
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40(2) measures specifically targeting restrictions in international
transfer of technology. This feature does not necessarily belong to what
42
is usually seen as the core of antitrust in U.S. and E.U. laws.
Nevertheless, this “development component” included in TRIPs may be
seen as an apt complement to classic competition rules. In the light of
43
prior negotiations, its inclusion in an international text largely
dedicated to North-South IP dealings appeared entirely appropriate.
It may be argued that TRIPs antitrust provisions are enabling rather
than mandatory in character. This conclusion, while partly true, does
not detract at all from their effectiveness and reach. Indeed, most of the
provisions listed earlier (with a few minor exceptions that we are going
44
to look at briefly) are not mandatory because Members are by no
means under a legal obligation to adopt them. Surely, if a Member
abstains from enacting provisions providing for the prohibition and
control of IP-related anti-competitive practices, this legislative option is,
in principle, unobjectionable and cannot lead to a complaint under the
45
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), as would be the case in
connection with a failure to enact and implement TRIPs-mandated IP
protection.
However, it should also be clear that in this context the enabling
character of TRIPs is apt to expand rather than to restrict the
lawmaking powers retained by Members at the intersection between IP
and antitrust. The very fact that TRIPs, while extensively and
intensively harmonizing intellectual property, confines itself to deferring
to Members’ lawmaking powers in this area confers a quite special
meaning to the reticence employed by the Agreement in describing anticompetitive or otherwise restrictive behavior and remedies available
against them. Indeed, saying so little in the international instrument
means, by necessary implication, recognizing a correspondingly
expansive latitude to the relevant domestic lawmaking powers retained
by the Members. In this regard, one might well say that the otherwise

42. But see Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 (Apr. 6, 1995); Commission Regulation 772/2004, Application of
Art. 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 123)
11 (EC).
43. See U.N. Set, supra note 4; see also supra note 14.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41.
45. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
But see Ullrich, supra note 8, at 409–10.
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over-prescriptive TRIPs builds in this area an architecture based on
authorization plus reticence, whereby this formula alludes to a
combination of deference to Members’ lawmaking authority in antitrust
and caution in detailing the extent of the powers retained by the
Members themselves.
It has been argued that “the open-ended wording of [Articles] 8.2.
[and 40] suggests that [these provisions were] intended as . . . rule[s] of
containment for national competition policy rather than as a norm
46
informing the proper development of such policy.” My view is just the
opposite. Surely, an international antitrust agreement along the lines
envisaged by section 20 of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
47
Ministerial Declaration issued in Singapore during December of 1996
might have functioned as an effective rule of containment for national
competition rules; and, precisely for this reason, it was rejected in
48
Cancún by a coalition of developing countries two years ago. It is
possible that the original intent of the trade representatives for
developed countries in the last stage of TRIPs negotiations was to resist
the claims made by developing countries’ representatives in this area
and to establish some sort of a rule of containment for national
49
If this is so, then resorting to open-ended
competition policies.
language through enabling provisions, as the ones sketched above in
Part I.A.1, was clearly a self-defeating option. Indeed, by refraining
from detailing the limits set by international public law to municipal

46. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 414.
47. A discussion of the findings of the Working Group on the Interaction Between
Trade and Competition Policy set up under section 20 of the Ministerial Declaration may be
found in Robert D. Anderson, Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and
International Trade: Reflections on the Work of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy (1996–1999), in 3 WORLD TRADE FORUM,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADE, COMPETITION, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
235 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003).
48. For a provisional assessment of this outcome, see Taimoon Stewart, The Fate of
Competition Policy in Cancún: Politics or Substance?, 31 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON.
INTEGRATION 7, 7 (2004).
49. For accounts of varying completeness of TRIPs negotiations in this specific area,
see DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 61–
63, 190–93 (1998), Amy S. Dwyer, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in 4
THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1994): THE END GAME
(PART I) 461, 474–75 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993), Ana María Pacón, What Will TRIPs Do
For Developing Countries?, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADERELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 329, 333–34,
and Julie C. Ross & Jessica A. Wasserman, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992):
COMMENTARY, supra, at 2245.
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sovereigns’ jurisdiction in the area at the intersection between antitrust
and IP, TRIPs has gone exactly the other way. Not surprisingly, careful
scholars have not hesitated to identify, in the enabling character of the
relevant provisions, a confirmation of the “neofederalistic
50
underpinnings of TRIPs.” I fully subscribe to this view in general,
particularly in connection with the room for maneuvering left to
51
Members in this field.
Having said so much about the expansionary thrust of the enabling
features of TRIPs provisions at the intersection of IP and antitrust, one
should not forget that these also incorporate quite a substantial number
of mandatory features. This is certainly the case in connection with the
notion of measures “consistent with the provisions of this Agreement”
under Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 40(2). We shall look at these in the next
section; however, we should note in passing that a Member adopting
measures at the intersection of IP and antitrust in breach of Articles
8(1), 8(2) and 40(2) would certainly be liable to be brought before a
WTO panel under Article XXIII(1)(a) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994.
Other mandatory features are also found in a number of the
provisions discussed earlier. Express refusal or unjustified failure to
enter into the consultations provided for by Articles 40(3) and 40(4)
may constitute a breach relevant under the DSU. It cannot even be
ruled out that Member behavior fostering anti-competitive practices by
intellectual property rights owners that are nationals or residents of that
Member may be in direct breach of Article 8(2). The same conclusion
may be reached in connection with Member tolerance of anticompetitive practices by intellectual property rights owners who are
nationals or residents of that Member, to the extent the same practice
would be proscribed if its effects were felt on the domestic market of the
same Member and would be condoned on the sole ground that its
52
effects are felt only on foreign markets.
Similarly, an actionable breach may be found under Article 67 in the
event a request for assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations
on the prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights is expressly
refused or, even if accepted, proves obviously inadequate.
On the other hand, it has been persuasively argued that the
obligation by developed member countries under Article 66(2) to
50. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 447.
51. For a similar conclusion, see Abbott, supra note 10, at 692–93, 698.
52. See Odman, supra note 11, at 362–64.
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“provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for
the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to leastdeveloped country Members in order to enable them to create a sound
53
and viable technological base” is not directly actionable, because
54
compliance with it is based on a best-efforts standard. I am inclined to
agree to the extent we visualize least-developed member countries as
plaintiffs. However, I am not sure that the same conclusion would apply
in the reverse situation in which the least-developed member country
could find itself in the position of defendant as a consequence of a
separate breach of another TRIPs provision. Theoretical analysis
conducted a few years ago found that this kind of situation has a high
55
statistical rate of probability; therefore, it may be of some practical
relevance to question whether a defendant Member could raise a cleanhands defense or even a counterclaim on the basis of non-compliance
with Article 66(2) by the plaintiff Member. If this were so, then Article
66(2) would also end up being an actionable provision under the DSU.
4. The Notion of Measures “Consistent with the Provisions of this
Agreement”
There is no doubt that the constraints posed on Members’ discretion
to enact legislation at the intersection between IP and antitrust belong
to the mandatory component of TRIPs and, therefore, should be taken
seriously. In spite of what I have been arguing about the “architecture
of authorization plus reticence” of TRIPs in this area, the flexibility of
Members in connection with the shaping of their laws in this field is far
from being unfettered, as we shall presently see.
It has been remarked that Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 40(2), by requiring
that the measures contemplated therein are “consistent with the
56
provisions of this Agreement,” establish “only a safety zone for the
57
core of intellectual property protection,” and that from these
provisions it follows that Members “may not use antitrust regulation as

53. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 66(2).
54. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From Negative to Positive Integration in the WTO:
The TRIPs Agreement and the WTO Constitution, in 3 WORLD TRADE FORUM,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADE, COMPETITION, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 47, at 21, 32. The opposite view is expressed by Odman, who believes the
provision to be directly applicable. Odman, supra note 11, at 351–54.
55. See R.K. Burch et al., Divergent Incentives to Protect Intellectual Property: A
Political Economy of North-South Welfare, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 169, 178 (2000).
56. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
57. Ullrich, supra note 8, at 410.
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a pretext to undermine the protection of IP rights as guaranteed by the
58
TRIPs Agreement.”
59
I believe that this is just about right; but, we should explore what
the words “the core of IP protection” and “undermining” may exactly
mean.
In this regard, I should note that, historically, GATT 1949 subjected
the exercise of domestic powers to a general test of reasonableness and
two accompanying criteria. Measures dealing with IP were not to be
applied in ways that “would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail” or in ways that constitute “a disguised restriction on
60
international trade.”
The impact of these criteria over reserved
domestic powers has usually been regarded as limited because the same
criteria were based on traditional international trade negative
61
obligations and were applied only to trade in goods.
Thus, it is
typically discriminatory IP treatment of imports or exports of tradeable
goods that is subject to GATT scrutiny.
The WTO Agreement supersedes GATT but adds additional layers
of international rules that take the shape of both negative and positive
obligations. The latter include, as indicated, the most-favored nation
treatment and a wide range of uniform minimum standards of IP
protection. In turn, minimum standards—built by incorporating a
substantial number of new specific TRIPs provisions to the major
international IP conventions—currently extend well beyond the original
list. In this latter context, the issue of compatibility is visualized as a
question of levels of protection of IP assets or, more precisely, of
achieving the mandate of uniformity in minimum standards, rather than
as an issue of discriminatory treatment of imports and exports of
tradeable goods.
Whatever discretion is retained by Members and whatever flexibility
in implementing TRIPs is granted to them, the precept of uniformity in
minimum standards of protection and the dual principles of national

58. Id.
59. And consistent with the finding of the Panel Report, United States—Section 211
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 8.57, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter
Section 211 Panel Report].
60. These provisions are still to be found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX & XX(d), 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
61. For a similar point, see Petersmann, supra note 54, at 27, and Silke Von Lewinski,
The Role of Copyright in Modern International Trade Law, 161 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT D’AUTEUR 1, 11 (1994).
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treatment and most-favored nation treatment are mandatory in
character and therefore to be fully respected. Recital 6 and Article 1(1),
while allowing for flexibility in domestic lawmaking, are also extremely
clear in connection with the other side of the coin. As remarked
62
earlier, both national treatment and most-favored nation treatment
concern not only IP protection but also the antitrust measures
connected with it. More importantly, flexibility is limited to methods of
protection; conversely, the net outcome of mandated minimum
protection is non-negotiable. The last sentence of Article 1(1) states the
following: “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method
of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
63
system and practice.” But the first sentence, ostensibly dealing with
net outcomes, is crystal clear: “Members shall give effect to the
64
provisions of this Agreement.” Thus, while Members retain the power
to enact domestic measures at the intersection of antitrust and IP along
a wide spectrum of choices, these are permitted only insofar as they
comply with national treatment and most-favored nation obligations
and do not compromise uniform minimum standards of IP protection.
However, even accepting this, we should question what, in each case,
are the net outcomes of IP protection envisaged by TRIPs, and, more
specifically, whether the interpretation of TRIPs-mandated uniform
standards provisions should give an appropriate place to TRIPs general
principles, and what may be the impact of the latter on the former.
B. The Interplay Between Antitrust Provisions and General Principles
So far, we have looked at the contents, character and role of the
antitrust fragments (including what I earlier called the “development
component”) located in TRIPs. While this may provide some reply to
the questions initially raised in question (1) of the Introduction, we
certainly should not rest with this kind of very broad, general finding.
To deal with the issues raised in questions (2) and (3) of the
Introduction, we should now explore the link between these antitrust
provisions and the TRIPs’ general principles and inquire whether the
interplay between the two sets of provisions may give greater relevance
to pro-competitive values and may affect the amount of flexibility
65
retained by Members.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See supra Part I.A.3.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra Part I.A.3.
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More specifically, we should proceed in the direction indicated at the
close of the previous paragraph and explore the impact that the general
principles may have on the interpretation and application other TRIPs
provisions, including the mandate of TRIPs-consistency and the place in
this connection given to non-IP interests. These interests include the
claims for access to the existing intellectual property assets made by two
groups: (1) current users of technology-incorporating goods and (2)
subsequent generations of innovators bent on generating downstream
66
innovation based on prior technological knowledge.
In doing so, we should additionally inquire at which level a general
principles-based approach may become relevant in Members’ lawmaking process. Should we confine consideration of pro-competitive
inputs and of non-IP interests only to the areas specifically at the
intersection between antitrust and IP or should we extend this approach
to the so-called “development component,” particularly in connection
with measures specifically targeting international transfer? Or finally,
should we go all the way to envisage the possibility that pro-competitive
inputs, rather than being superimposed from the outside on the exercise
of IP by means of ex post antitrust measures, may instead be
incorporated ex ante from within the legislative design of individual IP
rights?
1. The Historical Background
Frankly, if we were to confine ourselves to looking at the legislative
history of the process that led to the negotiation and adoption of TRIPs,
we could not expect much in terms of adoption of pro-competitive
values and flexibility intended to accommodate the claims for access to
IP assets made by current users and future innovators.
The
corresponding tale has been told a number of times and is roughly made
of three ingredients.
67
First, IP has become part and parcel of the new GATT-WTO
framework because low standards of IP protection in the South have

66. On the characteristics of technological innovation that make it more dependent
than in the past on prior strata of accumulated knowledge, see Reichman, Legal Hybrids,
supra note 7. For a thoughtful analysis of the standing of the claims of current users and
future innovators within TRIPs, see Carlos M. Correa, Pro-Competitive Measures under the
TRIPs Agreement to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing Countries, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 481 (2001).
67. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153
(1994).
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been conceptualized as a barrier to trade, hindering or restraining the
flow of Northern IP-incorporating goods and services toward the South
that otherwise would have occurred on a level playing field based on
uniform minimum conditions of IP protection. Second, this “producer
68
driven governance model” of IP, shaped by the “traditional export
69
interests” prevailing in the North, has been grudgingly accepted by the
South in exchange for the promise that the latter’s goods, including
agricultural products and textiles, would obtain access to the rich
consumer markets of the North. Third, the acceptance of TRIPsmandated levels of IP protection was far from enthusiastic and
unqualified. Before adopting the “package,” developing countries
insisted that the monopolistic potential of stronger IPs should be, at
least in part, counterbalanced by accommodating a competition law
70
component in TRIPs.
Against this background, we might well have expected that the
antitrust component is just another case in which, as it often happens,
weaker interests obtain symbolic rewards while concentrated, stronger
71
interests obtain tangible benefits. My idea is that in TRIPs there is
much more than that; and, that this more expansive understanding is a
necessary implication of TRIPs’ general principles.
2. Recitals 5 and 6 and Articles 7 and 8(1) of TRIPs
Let us look more closely at the text of TRIPs. Recital 5 to the
Preamble clearly envisages intellectual property protection not as an
end in itself but rather as a means to achieve further ends. The
Members “recogniz[e] the underlying public policy objectives of
national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
72
developmental and technological objectives.” Recital 6 addresses the
specific concerns that arise in connection with least developed member
countries: “[r]ecognizing also the special needs of the least-developed
country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to

68. Frederick M. Abbott, Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO: An Evolving
Model for Open-Architecture Integrated Governance, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 63 (2000).
69. Petersmann, supra note 54, at 26. For additional references, see Marco Ricolfi, The
Interface Between Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPs Agreement,
ITALIAN INTELL. PROP. 29, 33 nn.9–12 (Jan. 2002).
70. For references, see sources cited supra note 49.
71. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 17, at 193.
72. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, rec. 5.
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create a sound and viable technological base.” Article 7 clearly states
that “[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property” are
74
means intended to achieve a number of goals. It should be underlined
that such goals only in part coincide with the classical policy rationale
for protecting IP, the grant of protection as an incentive for the
75
provision of a public good.
More specifically, it seems quite
remarkable that the text of Article 7, while stressing that IP protection
and enforcement “should contribute to the promotion of technological
76
innovation,” does not stop there as one might have expected. Rather
the provision goes on to mention an additional purpose, “the transfer
77
and dissemination of technology,” that appears from the wording of
Article 7 to have the same cogency as the former one.
It could be argued that we should not read too much in the reference
to “the transfer and dissemination of technology.” After all, the more
sophisticated analysis of IP has shown quite a long time ago that IP is
concerned not just with incentives to the provision of innovation but
also with incentives to its dissemination. This is what Arrow’s
78
Disclosure Paradox is all about.
Except that, given the historical
background, one might read in the dual reference to “transfer and
dissemination,” which occurs both in Article 7 and in Article 40(1) in
exactly the same words, some kind of acknowledgement of the dual
claims of current users of technology-incorporating goods and future
innovators.
I submit that this reading is not so far-fetched as it appears at first
sight. And my argument builds on the final part of the wording of
Article 7. Indeed, it should be considered that this provision, after
mentioning the purposes of IP protection I just discussed, goes on and
refers to nothing less than “the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge” and expresses a clear option in favor of IP
protection modes shaped “in a manner conducive to social and
79
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”
This is really a gradual—and “grand”—opening of perspectives.
One is reminded of a traveling along a route on the bottom of the valley

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. rec. 6.
Id. art. 7.
See Arrow, supra note 5.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7.
Id.
See Arrow, supra note 5, at 615.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7 (emphasis added).
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when the progress of the road keeps disclosing a number of lateral
views. Intellectual property is the means because it serves two
immediate purposes: incentive for the provision of a public good and
for its transfer and dissemination. But there is more to it, because even
these purposes are not ends by themselves but should serve additional,
broader societal aims. Several of these broader aims are specifically
mentioned in Article 8(1). Among these, competitive concerns,
including the claims of current users and future innovators, should not
be disregarded if the mandate of Articles 7 and 8(2) is to be taken
seriously.
3. Taking the General Principles Seriously
But then, should we really take the TRIPs’ general principles
seriously? This is a serious question, not a rhetorical one, because we
may suspect that some portions of TRIPs may amount to nothing more
than “window dressing.” This suspicion, which usually crops up when a
“development component” is superimposed on international trade
80
compacts, might be examined by asking what the reference to “social”
welfare adds to the usual economic characterization of welfare itself,
which, as it is now commonly recognized, encompasses distributional
and fairness concerns on top of allocative and productive efficiency
goals. Also, the reference to a balance of rights and obligations may
seem as vague as it is broad.
However, these broader societal concerns seem in fact to have been
given appropriate consideration by the international community on a
number of occasions. Non-IP interests, particularly of users, were taken
into account in the August 2003 deliberation, leading to the WTO
decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
81
on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health.
And one may well
discern that efforts currently under way to make the patent system
mutually supportive with the objective of preserving and fostering
80. As exemplified by the thoughtful remarks by Simon J. Evenett, Systemic Research
Questions Raised by the Failure of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancún, 31 LEGAL ISSUES
OF ECON. INTEGRATION 1, 5 (2004) (noting that some argue that the “Doha Ministerial
Meeting is unimportant windowdressing”).
81. See generally Gionathan Curci & Massimo Vittori, Improving Access to Life-Saving
Patented Drugs: Between Compulsory Licensing and Differential Pricing, 7 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 739 (2004); M. Rafiqul Islam, The Generic Drug Deal of the WTO from Doha
to Cancún: A Peripheral Response to a Perennial Conundrum, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
675 (2004); Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential
Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 73 (2004).
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biodiversity can be better visualized under the heading of “social
welfare,” because this notion implies a respect for the autonomy of the
(also non-IP) values of indigenous communities that may well defy the
flatness of the calculus felicificus at which economists are so adept. So,
arguably the characterization of IP as a means to achieve a variety of
goals under Article 7, including concerns about access by current users
and future innovators, does have some meaning after all.
Of course, one could say that there is an altogether different reason
why TRIPs visualizes IP as a means rather than as an end. As it has
83
been quite rightly remarked, TRIPs is not an exercise in harmonization
of intellectual property. Harmonization and uniformation is what the
European Union does; but then, the European Union is about building
shared legal institutions within an economic and political union. The
overall purpose of WTO and TRIPs is altogether different and precisely
consists of the minimization of trade barriers, including those arising out
of divergence in IP. Therefore, IP protection and enforcement are seen
as means rather than ends in themselves. This seems quite true to me;
except that, in my opinion, this is only a part of the story. A closer
reading of TRIPs, as confirmed by subsequent behavior of Members
and international institutions of the kind I just mentioned, shows that IP
protection and enforcement are seen as means rather than ends in
themselves both because the larger ends encompass freedom of trade—
there is no way to deny this—and because the international community
is committed to taking into account other non-trade and non-IP factors
while shaping IP protection.
It would seem to me that pro-competitive concerns, including access
by “users of technological knowledge” under Article 7 such as current
users and future innovators, rank pretty high in the list of these other
purposes that are declared relevant by TRIPs principles. One could
even go so far as to argue that this conclusion is a necessary implication
of the very architecture of TRIPs, which considers competition law at
84
the intersection with IP as its own subject matter. Therefore, recitals 5
and 6 and Articles 7 and 8 should be taken seriously.

82. In this connection, one cannot be but impressed by the declarations of the then
E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights—Ten Years Later, 38 J. WORLD TRADE LAW 923, 928 (2004) (noting the reasons
supporting the incorporation of “a requirement into the TRIPs Agreement that patent
applicants should disclose the geographical source origin of the genetic material and the
related traditional knowledge used in an invention”).
83. Ullrich, supra note 8, at 408, 414.
84. See supra Part I.A.3
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Maybe what I am saying has a distinctively European ring to it. The
European Union, in IP matters as well as in a number of other areas,
seems to be moving back and forth between self-serving and short-term
motives, such as the creation of overprotective and protectionist regimes
concerning database and design protection and occasional attempts to
place itself on the moral high-ground. Maybe this latter attitude is the
basis of the positions of some high-ranking E.U. officials, such as the
former E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy who when commenting
on the first decade of TRIPs insisted on views similar to the ones I
85
expressed here about TRIPs principles. Intellectual property rights are
86
just “tools.” The ultimate ends are public health, access to nutrition,
development, and access to knowledge—even more broadly, public
87
interest and human rights. We cannot value the (private) means higher
88
than the (public) ends. The shrinking of the public domain poses a
threat to new creations and innovation. This difficulty should be
89
addressed by harnessing the flexibilities built within TRIPs. Reading
these statements, I am rather encouraged. However, I would have much
preferred to hear them when Mr. Lamy was at the beginning of his term
as E.U. Trade Commissioner rather than at the end when he had
become a candidate for the position of WTO Secretary. I should also
confess that at the same I time feel quite apologetic when I pause to
think about the disingenuous moves that the European Union from time
to time makes in connection with agriculture and textiles while
enunciating these lofty ideals. I know there is a contradiction here; but,
I also believe that there is no reason to throw the baby away with the
bath water.
4. Implementing the General Principles: Antitrust, Development
Component and Regime Design Fine-Tuning
It should be noted, going back to the questions I raised at the
beginning of this Part, that the general principles must be taken
seriously simply because they incorporate what is referred to as a
“development component” in connection with measures specifically
targeting international transfer of technology. While this may be an
important issue, particularly for developing countries, the goal of

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Lamy, supra note 82, at 925.
Id.
Id. at 925–26, 932.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 928–29.
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preserving access to technological knowledge by subsequent generations
of innovators has more to it than the distributional and fairness
concerns we generally associate with reference to a “development
component” of international trade agreements; indeed, it is about the
global economy and its long-term efficiency.
It would seem that the reading I just proposed here of TRIPs
general principles allows for ample room to rules aiming to preserve
competitive openness in downstream innovation markets. Indeed, as we
just noted, Article 7 of TRIPs advocates as its ultimate goal: “the
mutual advantage of producers and users of a technological knowledge.”
It is to be expected that, on top of the consideration due to the interests
of producers of current technology, the interests of those users of the
same current technology, who in turn are candidates to become IP
producers by generating and making available the next generations of
technologies, are given appropriate weight. In this connection, it should
be taken into account that these latter interests, while occasionally
conflicting with those of incumbent IP holders, can hardly be described
as non-IP and may prove essential under the current circumstances to
keep the innovation engine working. Because IP protection is not a
goal in itself, but a means intended to contribute to the provision and
dissemination of technological innovation, the “manner conducive to
social and economic welfare” recommended by Article 7 would seem to
require a fine balancing between claims to protection by current,
“incumbent” IP holders and claims to access to innovation markets by
subsequent, “new-comer” generations of IP providers.
So far we have been dealing with goals. Turning our attention to
means, or rather to the issue of the choice of means adequate to further
the relevant goals, we should note that a crucial question in this
connection is whether TRIPs enables the pursuit of these purposes not
only through ad hoc and ex post antitrust intervention but also through
generalized and ex ante measures. These measures include the option
to design the various features of intellectual property rights, such as the
access requirement, the scope of protection, or the limitations and
exceptions, in such a way to permanently incorporate pro-competitive
features.
To counter this latter possibility, it might be argued that TRIPs
makes room only for antitrust intervention. Any kind of measure not
specifically intended to prevent a restraint of competition, it might be
argued, is not TRIPs-compliant. This argument is clearly wrong. Under
Article 8(2), Members may also adopt legislation “to prevent the abuse
of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
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which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
90
transfer of technology” even in the absence of proof of a specific
91
restriction of competition. Indeed, as earlier remarked, resorting to
the disjunctive “or” in this provision clarifies that adverse impact on
international transfer of technology may be a sufficient basis for
92
legislation controlling IP abuse or dealings. So, the same issue that
gave rise to endless discussions when model laws were drafted with a
93
view to implementing the U.N. Set has been solved by a simple stroke
of the pen in the TRIPs context.
I submit that TRIPs’ general principles, as understood here, provide
a number of ways of advancing competitive concerns including the
possibility of incorporating pro-competitive features in the design of IP
rights. Generalized ex ante measures to advance pro-competitive
concerns in the design of specific IP regimes can clearly be encompassed
by the literal meaning of Article 8(2). Under certain conditions, the
balancing of competing claims by current IP holders and downstream
innovators favored by TRIPs general principles is best achieved by finetuning IP regime design rather than by antitrust intervention. Indeed,
the former may turn out to be more predictable in its outcome, because
it can be adopted ex ante rather than ex post by interested parties. It
may also entail a much greater level of legal certainty at the time the
initial decision as to investment in innovation is taken than is the case
with antitrust proceedings, in which the initiation of a controversy and
its ultimate results are to a very large extent unforeseeable.
Additionally, it should be considered that regime design fine-tuning
would have the advantage of being generalized rather than ad hoc,
translating into rules evenly applicable to all firms and business entities
that might find themselves in a set of in pre-defined circumstances. This
feature again compares well with antitrust intervention in terms of
TRIPs’ general principles because it would avoid the recurrent,
unfortunate situation whereby a firm subject to antitrust scrutiny is apt
to be singled out in ways that may entail the dangers of discriminatory
treatment. This risk is not to be lightly dismissed in contexts, as the one
considered here, in which antitrust is based on regional or national rules
applicable to both national and foreign firms and its enforcement, as we

90. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
91. See supra Part I.A.
92. A similar point is made by Ullrich. Ullrich, supra note 8, at 406; see also Odman,
supra note 11, at 348–49.
93. See SELL, supra note 17, at 166–69.
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shall see in more detail later, may turn out to be inappropriately
“selective.”
Of course, the kind of modification or adaptation of regime design I
described as fine-tuning should not subvert the basic features of the
relevant IP protection. Indeed, fine-tuning should be confined to minor,
“interstitial” adaptation of features, such as access requirement, scope
of protection, exceptions, initial ownership rules or transferability,
which make for a finer balancing of the interests at issue without
contradicting the basic premises of TRIPs-mandated minimum
protection. In this regard, the concept of fine-tuning seems to me the
reverse side of the notion of “net outcome,” which I earlier described as
94
TRIPs-mandated and non-negotiable. Minimum standards are not a
mandate for absolute uniformity in all Members’ IP laws, because total
uniformation in IP protection certainly is not the goal of TRIPs. Rather
the core of protection as envisaged by TRIPs should not be curtailed. It
is interesting to note that a recent World Trade Organization Panel
Report has similarly argued that the good faith principle guiding
Members in the exercise of their discretion is enshrined in the “a
95
balance of rights and obligations” language in Article 7.
While the option I described as regime design fine-tuning has these
obvious advantages, it has its limitations as well. To begin with, this
alternative is open only if and to the extent the mandate of TRIPs96
compatibility is respected. To make sure that this is the case, a number
of criteria has to be developed. I shall try to work out the details in Part
III. Nevertheless, coming back to the issue I raised in the final part of
Part I.A.4, it already appears possible at the present stage of the
discussion to build on the reading of TRIPs principles here proposed to
come to the conclusion that, in deciding whether TRIPs-mandated
uniform standards are compromised or not, the interpretation of the
relevant provisions should indeed give an appropriate place to TRIPs
general principles. In doing so, it is possible to reserve adequate
consideration both to the pro-competitive concerns these incorporate
and to the claims to access to IP from current users and subsequent
generations of innovators as recognized under Article 7 of TRIPs.

94. See supra Part I.A.4.
95. See Section 211 Panel Report, supra note 59, ¶ 8.57.
96. See supra Part I.A.4.
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5. The Constitutional Dimension of TRIPs: From Negative to Positive
Integration
97

As remarked earlier, TRIPs departs from the long tradition
whereby international IP conventions confined themselves to imposing
on Members only negative obligations, in particular by requiring
national treatment of foreigners, and takes the unprecedented step of
mandating positive obligations, including most-favored nation treatment
98
and greatly expanding minimum IP protection standards. What are the
implications of this new approach for the purpose of determining to
what extent TRIPs authorizes IP-interfacing competition rules to
consider non-IP interests, including claims to access by current users
and future innovators?
One can look at this issue in two ways. By importing a constitutional
dimension into international public law, one may make the case that the
more extensive and intensive involvement of the international
community in shaping uniform IP rules, which hitherto had remained in
the preserve of domestic regulators, should be counterbalanced by an
expansive reading of the legislative powers retained by Members. It
may be also argued that this reading should, in particular, apply at the
intersection between IP and competition for reasons that appear wellgrounded on the reading of TRIPs’ general principles proposed here.
99
Reference to the neo-federalistic underpinnings of TRIPs might well
describe this former approach.
A more complex argument has been developed by international law
100
scholars.
According to this latter view, the move from negative to
positive integration of Members of the international community is not
confined to IP and TRIPs. Indeed, the same expansion has taken place
at the macro level. While 1949 GATT was based on negative
integration in the form of a ban on discrimination of foreign goods, the
1994 WTO-GATT architecture is based on positive integration. Indeed,
in addition to export trade, it also encompasses licensing of IP and
foreign direct investment, which is made apparent by the inclusion of
97. See supra Part I.A.
98. Originally, the only uniform minimum standards of protection to be found in
international IP conventions were the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art. 10bis, U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention] (as last at Stockholm July 14, 1967), and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, arts. 2(5), 5, 6bis, 11bis, 25 U.S.T.
1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as last revised at Paris on July 24, 1971).
99. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 447.
100. See Petersmann, supra note 54, at 29, 33–40.
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the GATS and TRIPs components in WTO’s single package. In this
perspective, the most-favored nation clause and uniform minimum
standards feature of TRIPs are still of paramount importance as a
corollary of the larger shift rather than for their specific significance. It
is forcefully argued that positive integration cannot remain confined to
markets, as the experience of E.U. integration has shown. Rather, it
triggers broader claims of political legitimacy that find a reply only on
the basis of a fundamental rights dimension. Competition rules, along
101
with the formation of a “broader political constituency” and the
establishment of appropriate mechanisms for upholding fundamental
human rights, are deemed to be the locus in which such broader claims
may find their proper basis.
While I have been a keen reader of Professor Petersmann’s work in
the last decades, I must also confess that I am not always sure that I am
able to make out exactly what he means. This is certainly due to my
limitations. As an IP and corporate lawyer, I certainly am not best
situated to grasp all the niceties and implications of international public
law scholarship. However, I will propose here a minimalist reading of
his argument. Petersmann’s work certainly does make a case for (a)
giving an appropriate place to the pro-competitive concerns
incorporated in TRIPs, such as the international constitutional
dimension at which the WTO compact places freedom of markets and
firms engaged in the market process has a constitutive (or is it
constitutional?) significance; and for (b) recognizing that WTO framers
thought that the best level in which this significance should be preserved
is, under the current institutional arrangements and as far as the IPcompetition intersection is concerned, the domestic level of Members’
municipal legislation.
Also, scholarship is a cumulative enterprise; thus, I expect that
further consideration, particularly by a younger generation of scholars,
may lead to the distillation of more clear and precise insights in this
admittedly obscure—and may be a bit “Hegelian”—corner of this
Article.

101. Id. at 26.
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II. MEMBERS’ OPTIONS
A. The Menu of TRIPs-Compliant Pro-Competitive Models
1. An Interim Balance
Even if one accepts the interpretive framework just proposed, what
sort of pro-competitive inputs fit the TRIPs architecture? The question
should be asked, because after so much talk about ends and means,
intermediate goals and final goals, and of constitutional dimensions and
federalistic underpinnings, one might start to wonder where promotion
of competition exactly belongs.
By now, we should be in a position to sketch a tentative reply to this
question by combining a few of the earlier findings.
First, we established that in this area TRIPs builds on an
102
architecture based on authorization plus reticence.
Therefore,
Members should be deemed to enjoy considerable latitude in shaping
their laws at the intersection between IP and antitrust. Such latitude fits
103
nicely into the larger picture.
Second, Members’ legislation authorized by TRIPs may no doubt be
intended to foster competition for the sake of competition itself under
classic antitrust laws, that is, to make sure that markets are kept open
and that decentralized price-based market mechanisms may contribute
to allocative and productive efficiency. However, TRIPs does not seem
to mandate that IP-interfacing competition rules envisage competitive
outcomes as their exclusive or main goal. On the contrary, it would
appear that Members may enact IP-interfacing competition rules while
keeping in mind other concurrent concerns, including the purpose of
curbing practices that may have a negative impact on transfer of
technology under Articles 7, 8(2), and 40 or restrict access by users and
104
subsequent generations of innovators again under Articles 7 and 8.
Third, I have argued that the reading of the TRIPs’ general
principles opens up the possibility of incorporating pro-competitive
concerns and giving adequate consideration to claims for access to IP by
current users and subsequent generations of innovators. Members may
do so by resorting to a variety of measures, including generalized ex

102. See supra Part I.A.3.
103. See supra Part I.B.3–4.
104. See supra Part I.B.2–4.
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ante rules in the very design of individual IP rights. I recognize that
this last point still needs being fleshed-out because I have not yet tried
to develop detailed criteria to deal with the overriding mandate of
TRIPs-compliance. Nevertheless, it appears to me that the best way to
go about in this kind of task is to look at the specifics of individual
issues, as I propose to do shortly in Part III.
By combining these findings, we should now be in a position to
perceive the width of the spectrum of choices enabled by TRIPs to
Members in connection with the shaping of their laws at the intersection
of IP and competition.
2. Varieties of Antitrust: The Benefits of Hindsight
How wide is the spectrum of available choices? In replying to this
question, we should start with classic antitrust or competition rules that
probably provide a lesson from our own past. Indeed, in the U.S. and
E.U. antitrust community in the last two or three decades, there has
been a certain amount of convergence on the issue of the purposes of
antitrust. On the two sides of the Atlantic, we seem to generally agree
that the dual goals of antitrust are allocative and productive efficiency.
They both put market mechanisms to the ultimate advantage of
consumers, and antitrust, being a remedy to market failure, protects
competition rather than competitors.
However, if this is our current position, things have been quite
different in the past. I do not want to go into all the various strands that
have from time to time found their place in the complex and fascinating
history of antitrust. What seems certain to me is that, at earlier times,
both American and European antitrust laws have been concerned about
the possibility that powerful combinations might, in the words of Justice
Peckham, drive “out of business small dealers and worthy men, whose
106
lives have been spent therein.” On other occasions, and notably at the
107
time of the passage of the Sherman Act and the introduction of
108
antitrust laws in post-World War II Germany, it has been the political
legitimacy of monopolistic power that has been questioned as
incompatible with our democratic forms of government.
105. See supra Part I.B.4.
106. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
107. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219 (1988), reprinted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS 85, 110–12 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991).
108. See Gerd Winter, Sozialisierung in Hessen 1946–1955, in KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 157
(1974).
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Moreover, fairness concerns have been recurrently incorporated into
antitrust assessments. This is precisely what happened on the American
side of the Atlantic when the goal of preserving the Jeffersonian ideal of
a sufficient number of (possibly small and local) competitors on the
market (notably against the risk of their “foreclosure”) has prevailed.
On the other side of the Atlantic, we Europeans have resorted to a
similar overstretching of competition laws to accommodate the eirenic
vision of a social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) with a
strong component of small and medium enterprises (Mittelstandschutz),
as advocated by the economist Chancellor Ludwig Erhard at the time of
Germany’s post-war economic boom.
Of course, we currently tend to regard these approaches as weak
109
minded, even if noble. However, the best of us have been able to
visualize that these very incomplete understandings have proved to be
necessary steps in the process that lead us to the present consensus, and
that what might appear with today’s lenses as an inconsistency or a
weakness did at the time play an important, if transitory role, in the
overall arrangement of legal affairs.
Therefore, it seems to me quite possible that features similar to the
ones we have in the meantime dismissed as unsatisfactory or even
unacceptable might initially crop-up in a number of TRIPs-enabled
competition laws. A practice that we, at this stage of our competition
laws, might regard as perfectly acceptable and even efficient, such as a
tie-in by a firm without market power, might well be considered unfair
or restrictive and, therefore, forbidden by emerging countries’
legislation. Harm to a weak competitor, which we might consider of no
material impact on competition or even the healthy expulsion from
market of the inefficient, may still be seen as objectionable. Scrutiny
over the “fairness” of the terms set by a dominant firm may appear
appropriate. These rules may appear wrong-headed to us; and they
probably are wrong. We should, however, make good use of the
benefits of hindsight. Therefore, we should remember that they
occasionally have served useful purposes at the time we, on both sides
of the Atlantic, adopted them or their equivalents.
More to the point, I believe that there is no legal objection under
TRIPs to these measures, which after all belong to the panoply of
instruments we have for a long time used under the heading of antitrust

109. Among whom I would like to include an Italian scholar, VINCENZO MELI,
RIFIUTO DI CONTRARRE E TUTELA DELLA CONCORRENZA NEL DIRITTO ANTITRUST
COMUNITARIO (2003).
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or competition law, “provided”—of course—“that they are consistent
110
with the [other] provisions of this Agreement” (which is a remarkable
restriction anyway, as we had a chance to see in the previous Part). This
conclusion seems to me even more warranted if we consider that, as just
indicated, Article 8(2) of TRIPs goes so far as to allow for legislation
intended “to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders or the resort to practices which . . . adversely affect the
111
international transfer of technology,” even in absence of proof of a
restriction of competition.
Surely, it is quite possible that some of the measures considered
TRIPs-compliant may eventually backfire on the economies of the
Members that adopt them. Indeed, licensing by Northern firms to
Southern businesses may end up being discouraged rather than
promoted by overly restrictive legislation. This simple rule applies
across-the-board:
to exchange control and profit repatriation
restrictions as well as to antitrust intervention aiming to forbid “unfair”
contractual arrangements. Just to mention an IP-specific situation, it
has been often argued that outlawing clauses that prevent licensees from
exporting licensed products either to the country of the licensor or to
those of other licensees may in actual practice have an adverse impact
on technology flows, thereby inducing a would-be licensor to give up the
112
idea of licensing in the first place. However, the point I am making
here is different. The wisdom of this sort of legislative measures should
be seen as an issue of policy; their ultimate economic outcome depends
on a matrix of factors among which the size of the market of the country
113
adopting the measure is probably a crucial one. I previously argued
that technical cooperation under Article 67 of TRIPs extends to the
preparation of laws and regulations on the prevention of abuse of
114
intellectual property rights, including anti-competitive abuses. I would
also suggest that Members with antitrust expertise should give
independent (and disinterested) advice to help developing and least-

110. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
111. Id.
112. For a full treatment of this issue, see Talia Einhorn, The Impact of the WTO
Agreement on TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) on EC Law: A
Challenge to Regionalism, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1069 (1998).
113. Data about the correlation of market size, IP protection, and decisions concerning
the mode of exploitation of technology (exports of goods, licensing, foreign direct
investment) is accumulating.
For a preliminary review, see Reichman & Maskus,
Globalization, supra note 7, at 287–91.
114. See supra Part I.A.
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developed Members distinguish measures that are economically
expedient under their specific domestic circumstances from those that
are likely to backfire. But this does not in any way amount to saying
that inappropriate measures would thereby be ipso facto in breach of
TRIPs.
However, there are cases in which a measure adopted by a Member
may be in breach of TRIPs. And this is case, as we just saw, when they
are not consistent with “the provisions of this Agreement” under
Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 40(2). Otherwise, Members do enjoy wide
discretion in framing rules at the intersection between IP and
competition.
B. Effectiveness Issues
Will Members, in fact, make use of such a discretion? This is a
factual question that will find a satisfactory reply only through evidence
of future actual practice. However, I raise it here because it would
appear to me that we are already in a position to make at least an
educated guess as to the likelihood of future developments in this area.
1. Dissemination-Oriented Competition Rules and Developing
Countries
In this connection, I would not make too much of the fact that an
ever-growing number of member countries have adopted rules that can
be loosely described as competition, antimonopolistic or antitrust
115
laws.
This is to a large extent an irrelevancy, because a very large
percentage of these laws has remained on the books only, actual
116
implementation being either occasional or even non-existent.
What are the reasons for this kind of failure, which is particularly
widespread among developing countries? The fact is that emerging
economies do have a number of reasons to be cautious in embracing
antitrust. Their political and academic elites tend to see antitrust as a
body of rules originating from developed nations and hardly adaptable
to their widely different economic and social environments, in which
State intervention and action by public enterprises tends to be
117
extensive.
Indeed, the case has often been made that the most
115. Monti, supra note 36, at 81 (reporting that in 2001, eighty WTO Members had
enacted one form or other of antitrust laws).
116. See Joel Klein, Expanding our Web of Bilateral Agreements, in COMPETITION
POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 335, 338–39.
117. See AJIT SINGH & RAHUL DHUMALE, COMPETITION POLICY, DEVELOPMENT
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appropriate timing for implementing competition policy should be
selected on the basis of the stage of economic development in which
118
each economy finds itself. In earlier phases of economic development,
what is labeled as dynamic efficiency, may be perceived as more
important than static efficiency. Accordingly, the goal of keeping prices
down and increasing consumers’ choice may be deemed to have a lower
119
priority than investment and economic growth.
It is argued that, if
developing countries were to adopt antitrust, at a minimum they should
incorporate “asymmetrical” rules in favor of what are usually called
120
infant industries.
In a similar vein, it is suggested—now not always
quite as openly as in the past—that competition rules for developing
countries should leave open the possibility for the kind of government
intervention in the market place that, while disparagingly described by
free-marketeers as industrial policy or mercantilism, has sometimes
proved exceedingly successful, as evidenced by the high rate of
economic growth of the countries usually described as Asian Tigers
121
(Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore).
Maybe we should examine the reasons that explain this attitude of
122
caution, if not of suspicion, usually experienced by developing
countries in connection with antitrust. If we do this, we might perceive
what lies at the heart of this quite widespread attitude. Antitrust is
liable to turn out to be a kind of Trojan horse of multinational
enterprises, because the nets of local regulations and reciprocal
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 11–13 (Trade-Related Agenda, Dev., & Equity (TRADE),
Working Paper No. 7, 1999), reprinted in WHAT GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS? 122, 132–34
(Philip Arestis et al. eds., 2001).
118. For this kind of argument, see Kerrin M. Vautier, Competition Policy, the Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council and the WTO, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND 131, 143 (Ramesh Adhikari &
Prema-chandra Athukorala eds., 2002).
119. See SINGH & DHUMALE, supra note 117, at 133–34; see also Jenny, supra note 35,
at 312 (discussing the issues that surfaced several times during the meetings held by the
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy).
120. For a sympathetic discussion of this argument, see Jenny, supra note 35, at 308–09.
121. For a reference to the economic choices of Hong Kong and Singapore, see
Vautier, supra note 118, 133–34. For discussion specific to the desire of developing countries
to retain flexibility in the setting up crisis and rationalization cartels, see Clifford A. Jones &
Mitsuo Matsushita, Global Antitrust in the Millennium Round: The Ways Forward, in
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 397, 405–406.
122. I think it is more accurate to refer to caution than suspiciousness or reluctance
towards antitrust in this context, because in recent decades on a number of occasions
developing countries seem to have shown interest and even entertained hopes in the
possibilities of development-friendly uses of antitrust. In this connection, and in a political
sciences perspective, see SELL, supra note 17, at 175–216.
AND
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understandings between firms that knit together domestic businesses
and helped them to keep afloat on the market risk to be challenged and
ultimately displaced by strict enforcement of antitrust and its precepts of
market access and parity of competitive conditions. Indeed, it has been
forcefully argued that what is described as a level playing field in actual
practice is “tilted in favour of multinationals;” and this point, made by
123
writers clearly engaged in favor of developing countries, is embraced
124
Therefore, it is hardly
also by much more detached scholars.
surprising that, among the many grounds of failure of the still recent
Cancún summit, we should find a total refusal by developing countries
125
to include in the agenda the issue of international antitrust.
However, it should be noted that none of the reasons of caution,
reluctance or resistance towards antitrust enforcement apply when
considering the specific field that is located at the intersection between
IP and competition. This is so for a very simple reason: the promotion
of competition leads to a one-way street. In fact, IP assets typically
belong to holders who are not nationals of developing countries, as
evidenced by all available statistics and confirmed by the history of
TRIPs negotiations I earlier referred to above. Therefore, adopting
competition rules at the intersection with IP, possibly in combination
with measures specifically targeting restrictions in international
transfers of technology, seems to be apt to bring to developing
countries’ economies many of the predictable benefits associated with
competition policies without incurring most of the perceived risks.
Coming back to the question that opened this Part, the reply seems
to be in the affirmative, at least in part. It seems likely that a number of
Members, including developing member countries, will indeed have
incentives to make use of the discretion accorded to them by TRIPs at
the intersection of IP and antitrust. This seems even more likely,
considering the number of available choices. When the menu is ample
126
and varied, it becomes easier to find an option that is perceived as
palatable. And it seems that this forecast can be corroborated by
pointing to the writings of a younger generation of developing countries’
scholars that are advocating a well-tempered use of competition law at
the intersection with IP and preparing a number of carefully calibrated

123.
124.
125.
126.

SINGH & DHUMALE, supra note 117, at 128.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 17, at 187.
See Stewart, supra note 48.
See supra Part II.A.2.
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recommendations for their policymakers precisely in this field.

2. Innovation-Oriented Competition Rules in Global Innovation
Markets
There is a second, separate reason for questioning whether procompetitive inputs may have a real impact over the current trends in IP.
The argument has been raised in connection with cutting-edge, highinnovation technologies, rather than with developing countries as in the
previous paragraph. In this context, it has been noted that TRIPsenabled competition rules, even if they were to be enacted and
enforced, may at a maximum play a limited role in counteracting IP
overprotection, because they follow a model of competition policy that
128
has in the meantime become obsolete. This is so, it is argued, because
classic antitrust deals with products’ markets and with post-innovation
technology transfers from advanced to less-advanced industries and
129
firms; however, these areas have become marginal as the main focus of
130
IP protection has shifted from “tangible material embodiments” —
such as mechanical devices, chemical and pharmaceutical products—to
new varieties of subject matter “in their disembodied state” (such as
131
software and DNA code). While dissemination-oriented competition
law has gradually becomes less relevant, tangible product markets
recede, and innovation markets become crucial, the new innovationoriented competition policy that has emerged in the United States and
in the European Union is perceived as increasingly unequal to the
original antitrust mission of preserving open and competitive markets.
More recent competition laws, when dealing with novel forms of
disembodied subject matter, are seen as engaging in a race of laxitude,
in which the dominant criterion becomes the measurement of some
notion of innovation efficiency rather than of the restrictive impact of
127. See Odman, supra note 11; see also Stewart, supra note 48. For additional
references, see Pacón, supra note 49, at 348–56. However, it appears noteworthy that the
younger generation of developing countries’ scholars also include voices, such as Ignacio De
Leon, The Dilemma of Regulating International Competition under the WTO System, 18
ECLR 162 (1997) (presenting a closely argued case against the soundness of the theoretical
basis of antitrust by reopening the controversy—which seemed closed half a century ago—on
the very justiciability of this area of law).
128. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 421. For a similar analysis, see supra text
accompanying notes 7–8.
129. Ullrich, supra note 8, at 420.
130. See id. at 416.
131. See id.
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132

current arrangements.
Once again, I am neither totally sure that I fully understand all of
this nor that I totally agree with what I understand. So, I believe that I
have already stated clearly enough the reasons why I do not see TRIPsenabled competition rules as mainly focusing on two-party licensing,
even though I can see the danger to new-comer Members in the field of
antitrust. For instance, developing countries might end up giving too
much weight to issues that may have become less crucial, such as the
control of clauses perceived as restrictive in technology transfer and
133
licensing.
Also, I agree that, by moving upstream IP protection, developed
countries, particularly the United States and the European Union, may
have made it more difficult to preserve the delicate balance between
incentives to innovation and competitive openness. This trend may
threaten both the long-term efficiency of the global economy and, in
part, the chances of those developing countries that strive, sometimes
with remarkable success, to stay at the cutting-edge of innovation.
Indeed, it is the perception of precisely these developments that has
supplied the starting point of this Article.
However, it also seems that this challenge may be met in TRIPscompliant ways both by developed and developing Members on the
basis of the prior findings. In general terms, TRIPs allows for a wide
menu of pro-competitive options. More specifically, these include a
spectrum of options consisting not only of traditional ex post antitrust
intervention and measures specifically targeting international transfer of
technology, but also of the kind of ex ante pro-competitive features in
the design of individual IP rights that this Article earlier described as
regime fine-tuning. The emergence of this novel form of norm-making
at the intersection of IP and competition should hardly be surprising if it
is true that novel challenges tend to generate fresh opportunities.
III. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: FIVE EASY PIECES
It is sometimes said that the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
So, it may be advisable at this juncture to turn to the analysis of a few
specific examples of areas in which IP protection and competitive
concerns meet to identify with the necessary precision the options
132. See id. at 421–26. There are E.U. group innovation incentives in areas such as
pooling, cross-licensing, joint research and development, which parallel similar developments
in the United States. See id. at 418–20.
133. See supra Part I.A.1.
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available to Members and to assess their TRIPs-compatibility. As to the
sequence, this Article will initially look at measures specifically
targeting restrictions in the international transfer of technology, then
the classical antitrust intervention, and finally the kind of generalized ex
ante measures described above as regime design fine-tuning.
A. Measures Specifically Targeting Restrictive Behavior in International
Transfer of Technology
1. Ex post Intervention in International Technology Transfer
We may as well start with an easy one. As earlier indicated, there is
no doubt that Members may adopt appropriate measures to control or
forbid licensing practices or unilateral behavior concerning IP that may
adversely affect international trade under Articles 8(2) and 40(2) of
TRIPs. It is also without question that such measures, whether
concerning bilateral or unilateral behavior, may be adopted even in the
absence of proof that they involve a specific restriction of competition,
such as would be required under classical antitrust rules. Therefore, to
134
establish TRIPs-compatibility of a given provision, it is not required
that the behavior subject to control or prohibition is prejudicial to
135
competition at large rather than to a specific competitor. This is not
136
so simply because, as we established above, TRIPs leaves room to a
wide spectrum of varieties of antitrust.
Rather a threshold
consideration is controlling here: establishing the anti-competitive
character of the controlled or forbidden behavior is not a requirement
under Article 8(2).
However, it has been persuasively argued that the competitionrestrictive nature of a technology transfer clause or agreement is a
necessary connecting factor under Article 40(2), even though it is not a
137
factor determining the outcome of the control. This is most probably
so; however, it does not seem to rebut the point previously made.
Indeed, as noted above in Part I.A.1, Article 8(2) covers both unilateral
and bilateral behavior because it refers to the notion of “practices.”
134. As was probably the case in connection with model laws under the U.N. Set. See
SELL, supra note 17, 164–68.
135. An example of the latter might be a clause requiring a licensee to purchase
quality-sensitive inputs exclusively from a licensor not possessing market power. An example
of the former would be a clause or practice (e.g., a ban on competition in research and
development) undermining licensee’s technological independence.
136. See supra Part II.A.2.
137. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 406 n.21.
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Thus, a provision that may fail to be TRIPs-compliant under Article
40(2)—because it lacks the required connecting factor—is still apt to be
found legitimate under Article 8(2).
In this connection, it should be noted that so far we have been
talking about Members’ provisions that forbid or control behavior by
private parties. The corresponding rules are negative, in that they tell
private parties what they are not supposed to do. Should the same
private parties fail to comply with the rule, the Member’s legal system
may ex post react on the basis of an ad hoc judicial or administrative
decision, the effects of which are limited to that specific situation.
2. Local Working Requirements
Now, we should look at the question of whether Members are
permitted under TRIPs to structure their patent laws in such a way as to
insert a requirement of local working. If so, the holder of a patent
granted by the Member’s legal system has what prima facie would
appear as an affirmative duty to exploit the patent in the country of the
grant pursuant to the provision of Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention
and is subject to compulsory licensing under Article 5(A)(2) and (4)
thereof in the event he or she fails to work it for a given number of
consecutive years from the date of the filing or the grant.
138
This issue is understandably hotly debated. If failure to work were
to trigger liability to compulsory licensing, the corresponding provision
would translate into a powerful incentive for patent holders to engage in
local working, rather than in manufacturing elsewhere and importing.
In turn, this would encourage patentees to transfer technology from
those more advanced economies in which they are likely to be
headquartered to the country imposing the requirement. Such a rule
would accordingly not only be perceived as making a significant
contribution towards the technological development of the Member of
the grant but also as providing a formidable means of coercion over
patentees.
It might be argued that the rule would be covered, as to its
TRIPs-compliance, by both sections of Article 8. Article 8(1) provides
138. See Thomas Cottier, The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT, 28
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 383, 408 (1991); Correa, supra note 66, at 490; Gustavo Ghidini,
“Equitable sharing” of Benefits of Biodiversity-Based Innovation: Some Reflections Under the
Shadow of a Neem-Tree, ITALIAN INTELL. PROP. 39, 45–46 (2002); Pacón, supra note 49, at
340; Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM
GATT TO TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 160, 204–05.
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in part that “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary . . . to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided such measures are consistent with the provisions
139
of this Agreement.” Thus, it may be argued that local working may be
mandated by Members at least in “sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development.” In turn, Article 8(2)
provides that “appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent . . . the
resort to practices which . . . adversely affect the international transfer
140
of technology.” This latter provision might be read as justifying local
working requirements across-the-board, particularly if we subscribe to
the view that, under the notion of “practices which . . . adversely affect
the international transfer of technology,” we can understand not only
unilateral or bilateral behavior by patent holders vis-à-vis actual or
potential business partners, as we have assumed so far, but also a purely
unilateral behavior, such as manufacturing abroad and importing into
the Member.
This approach might be supported by reference to the provision
of Article 5A of the Paris Convention, because paragraph 2 of this
provision, which was incorporated by reference in TRIPs through
Article 2(1), considers “failure to work” a patent as a mode of exercise
of the right that may be deemed abusive and, thus, subject to the
141
remedy of compulsory licensing.
On the other hand, this conclusion may be challenged by
referring to the text of Article 27(1) of TRIPs, which quite adamantly
states that “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable
without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology and whether
142
products are imported or locally produced.” This contrary argument is
supported quite strongly by current principles of purposive
interpretation. The WTO/GATT international economic context is
clearly based on the idea that the free flow of factors should be
liberalized so that the law of comparative advantages may foster the
optimal allocation of resources. Thus, it is very difficult to conceive that
Members’ legislation may still consider abusive decisions as to the

139. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
140. Id. art. 8(2).
141. See Correa, supra note 66, at 490. The opposite view is advanced by Straus, supra
note 138, at 204–05.
142. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (emphasis added).
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location in which patented goods are to be manufactured, because this
kind of choice should be in principle left to the decentralized decisions
143
Thus, it
of economic actors and sheltered from regulatory coercion.
does not seem to me that it could plausibly be argued that Article 27(1)
of TRIPs constitutes the lex generalis on patentable subject matter,
while Article 5A of Paris Convention contains the lex specialis on the
issue of local working. Indeed, if Article 5A still were understood as
implying that import of patented goods manufactured abroad is not
perfectly equivalent to local manufacture of the same goods, the
municipal legislation enacted under the old Paris Convention provision
would run counter the prohibition of “other measures” apt to restrict
144
the free flow of trade contained in Article XI of GATT.
Therefore, it appears that the mandate of TRIPs-consistency does
not allow that the rule of Article 27(1) regarding the equivalence of
imports to local manufacturing to be undermined by an across-theboard compulsory licensing regime triggered by failure to locally work
the patent. Neither Article 8(2) nor Article 31 of TRIPs could possibly
justify such a result, which would amount to a total negation of the
principle of equivalence. This outcome is corroborated even if we
consider TRIPs general principles: the development component can be
brought in to complement and fine-tune core IP protection, but not to
145
subvert it altogether.
On an earlier occasion, I have suggested that more specific and
146
limited measures might still be warranted under Article 8(1).
By
reading this latter provision in the light of the general principles-based
authorization to take into account the development component in IP
matters and particularly in the light of TRIPs recitals 5 and 6, it might
be possible to argue that Member legislation providing for compulsory
licensing in specific sectors, such as biotechnology, may be TRIPscompatible. More specifically, biodiversity-provider Members might
consider introducing a rule whereby holders of patents granted under
the legal system of that Member and based on locally obtained
biodiversity are required to locally work the patent and, in doing so, to
give preference to local inputs. Failure to do so would leave them

143.
144.
145.
146.

See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 411 n.45.
See Cottier, supra note 138, at 408.
See supra Part I.A.4.
See Marco Ricolfi, Tutela della concorrenza, proprietà intellettuale e TRIPs, in
ANTITRUST E GLOBALIZZAZIONE 141, 161–63 (2004).
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subject to compulsory licensing.
Also, this opinion might nevertheless be questioned by asking
whether this sort of measure would discriminate as to fields of
technology in a manner contrary to Article 27(1). Article 27(1) states
that “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
148
discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.” It may be conceded
that the envisaged measure would entail explicitly different treatment
for the specific sector, which is usually referred to as de jure
149
discrimination.
However, this assessment may not be conclusive,
because the extent to which the prohibition of technological
discrimination under Article 27(1) limits the ability of Members to
target certain technological fields in dealing with the important national
public policies referred to in Article 8(1) requires clarification. Indeed,
the fact that some sectors are singled out as of “vital importance” for
national policies under Article 8(1) by definition implies that the
corresponding measure operates selectively rather than across-theboard. Thus, I suggest that under a TRIPs general principles-based
interpretation, Article 27(1) may not altogether negate Article 8(1), and
vice versa. While Article 27(1) belongs to the core of patent protection
and cannot be subverted by local working measures applying across-theboard, the converse also applies: if the development component
expressly authorized by TRIPs is not to become altogether meaningless,
then the general rule under Article 27(1) may be subject to the explicit
derogation under Article 8(1) if and to the extent the important national
150
policies indicated therein so dictate.
If this is the case, then a local working requirement confined to a
specific sector, such as biotechnological inventions based on local
biodiversity, should be deemed TRIPs-compatible. The conclusion that
147. For a full treatment of this issue, see Ghidini, supra note 138, at 45–46. On
preference for local content, see also Odman, supra note 11, at 349.
148. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (emphasis added).
149. See Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.94,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, Canada].
150. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8,
at 434–36. See Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶ 7.210, WT/DS174/R
(Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Panel Report, European Communities] (stating that “many
measures [under Article 8(1)] to attain those public policy objectives . . . do not require an
exception under the TRIPs Agreement”). However, it would appear that this opinion,
expressed obiter, does not contradict the discussion in the text, because it does not rule out
that such measures may have an impact on the extent of IP exclusivity. On the different
question of the application of the antidiscrimination mandate to Article 30 TRIPs exceptions,
see infra Part III.C.1.
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“Art. 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems
151
that may exist only in certain product areas” has been reached under
the general provision dealing with exceptions to patent rights dictated
by Article 30 of TRIPs. The same principle should apply a fortiori
under the sector-specific powers retained by Members under Article
8(1). To establish whether a specific rule, as sketched above, is a bona
fide exception, subsequent practice of Members under Article 32 of the
152
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should be considered. In
this connection, reference should be made to Articles 1, 8(j), 16 and 19
of the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity of June 5,
153
1992.
The prohibition would apply, however, in the event the
technological specificity translates into a violation of the overriding
mandate of national treatment under Article 3, because a general
principles-based interpretation of TRIPs may not conceivably conflict
154
with this overarching norm of international IP.
What can one make out of this discussion? The careful reader
who has been following may have been misled into believing that, by
referring to the admissibility of a local working requirement, I intended
to reach the promised land of ex ante generalized rules and to contrast
their operation to ex post and ad hoc intervention through measures
targeting restrictions in international transfer of technology discussed in
the previous paragraph. The difficulty with this is that the distinction
between ex ante rules and ex post measures is in some way germane to
the distinction between regulation and antitrust intervention. It has
been said that “unlike antitrust policies, which tell businesses what not

151. See Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.92.
152. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention forms part of the “customary rules of
interpretation of public international law” within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the DSU.
See DSU, supra note 45, art. 3(2).
153. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
822 (1992).
154. An additional difficulty arises when we address the question of remedies to failure
to locally work a patent. Should the remedy take the form of liability to compulsory
licensing, as assumed throughout this section, then one would have to come to terms with the
idea that the provision dealing with compulsory licensing, Article 31, is mandatory and,
therefore, does not allow for any difference in the technical field of its application. See Panel
Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.90. There are reasons to doubt that this opinion, even if
authoritatively endorsed by a panel decision, is persuasive, because Article 31 has to be read
jointly with the other provisions of TRIPs, including Article 8(1). Remedial action, to which
subjection to compulsory licensing would amount to, is normally believed to be left to
Members’ discretion more than substantive IP provisions. Even those who subscribe to the
stricter opinion should then consider whether other remedies, such as a bar on exercising
patent rights (as in patent misuse cases), would be TRIPs-compliant.
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to do, regulation tells businesses what to do and how to price
155
However, the distinction between affirmative and
products.”
negative, between order and prohibition, is not always that clear-cut, as
shown in the case of prohibition of refusals to deal on dominant or
monopolistic firms, which may indeed be construed also as an
affirmative duty to negotiate. Looking carefully at local working
requirements, one will find a similar ambiguity. The requirement has an
affirmative side to it: it mandates patentees to manufacture locally. But
what happens in the event the patentee fails to do so? The remedy,
compulsory licensing, is conceptualized as a consequence of failure to
locally work so that we do not know exactly whether we are dealing
here with an ex ante rule or an ex post measure. To link with the
156
analysis proposed earlier, we should probably focus on a separate
feature by asking whether the legal consequence envisaged by the
applicable law is generalized or ad hoc. Here, the operational question
is more straightforward. Are we talking about a self-enforcing feature
that is automatic in its legal consequences and does not require for its
actual implementation a specific intervention by a court or another
decision-making body? Or are we talking about a rule that becomes
effective only after a decision by the competent authority? In the
former case, we are talking about a generalized rule; the latter is ad hoc
intervention.
In this latter perspective, the place of local working requirements
in international intellectual property is relatively clear. They may
possibly be considered a measure specifically targeting restrictions in
international technology transfer by mandating local working. They
also provide an incentive to the flow of technology in the jurisdiction
and a correlative disincentive to its restriction. But, this is only a matter
of linguistic choice without normative consequences.
What is
normatively relevant here is that the remedy in case of failure to meet
the mandate is usually conceptualized in terms of liability to compulsory
157
licensing, and that this form of remedial action is not automatic.
Rather, it may not be administered by the legal system of the relevant
jurisdiction without a specific, ad hoc intervention by a pre-determined
authority under Articles 31(a), 31(i) and 31(j) of TRIPs. Indeed, to

155. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICS 198 (17th
ed. 2001).
156. See supra Part I.B.4.
157. For a discussion about whether this remedy is TRIPs-compliant and on the
available alternatives, see supra note 154.
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come across pure ex ante, generalized rules shall wait until we come to
what I earlier described as regime design fine-tuning.
B. Antitrust Intervention
1. Refusal to Deal
People are familiar with thinking of refusal to deal as an antitrust
issue. But, of course, there are circumstances under which we might as
well visualize an IP-related refusal to deal as a practice adversely
affecting the international transfer of technology.
It has been argued that Members’ laws may provide for a remedy, be
it compulsory licensing or some kind of antitrust-specific relief in the
event an IP holder refuses to license his technology “on reasonable
158
commercial terms and conditions.” I disagree; this kind of rule would
not be TRIPs-compliant.
It is certain we cannot find a legal basis for this argument in Article
31(b). This provision refers to “reasonable commercial terms and
conditions;” but, it does so for an entirely different purpose, that is, to
clarify that no compulsory license may be granted if the would-be
licensee has failed to make efforts to obtain a voluntary license “on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”
Even from a competition law perspective, subsection (k) of Article
31, while dispensing from the requirement of prior bona fide
negotiations under subsection (b), requires that a specific “anticompetitive practice” is established on the basis of an individualized
judicial or administrative decision.
I submit that the anti-competitive character of the practice cannot be
found in the refusal to deal per se but must consist in separate restrictive
features in the relevant behavior of the IP holder. This additional
requirement is both a consequence of the wording of Article 8(2) of
TRIPs, which envisages the prevention of “abuse of intellectual
property rights,” and a necessary implication of the mandate of TRIPscompliance, specifically iterated in this same provision. Indeed, under
TRIPs, IP rights are conceived as exclusive property rights that are
159
protected under a most emphatic enunciation of property rules. Such

158. Correa, supra note 66, at 490.
159. In the notion explored in its general dimension by the classical work by Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124–25 (1972), and developed in the IP field
by Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
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an exclusivity, by its very definition, implies that the holder has the dual
prerogatives of authorizing third parties to use the IP and withholding
such an authorization.
Of course, we may question the wisdom of this arrangement. The
argument whereby property rules are an efficient initial entitlement that
not only provide an incentive to supply scarce public goods but also
open up the avenue to value maximizing voluntary exchanges is based
on a number of assumptions. These assumptions quite frequently do
not materialize in connection with novel forms of technological
innovation, as it is eloquently proved by inefficient developments in the
160
areas of biotechnology and digital innovation. I certainly share these
views and accordingly support the expansion of liability rules in a
number of areas of IP. Nevertheless, as a matter of interpretation of the
law as it stands, I also believe that we must acknowledge that TRIPs
conceives of IP rights as unequivocally protected under a black letter
property rule, that is, an entitlement that in European parlance is both
absolute erga omnes (protected against all the world) and in rem.
Accordingly, refusal to deal in IP is a mode of exercise of the right
that is expressly safeguarded by TRIPs. Therefore, in the absence of
additional and separate anti-competitive elements, Members may not
consider a refusal to deal abusive and outlaw it on competition law
161
grounds or any other grounds.
It would appear that this conclusion may not be questioned by
162
invoking a general principles-based approach.
Indeed, neither
incorporation of pro-competitive inputs nor consideration of non-IP
interests may subvert the fundamental choice of TRIPs to protect IP
under property rules. Neither Article 8(2) nor the other provisions
listed above in Part I.A.1 authorize Members to transform property
rules into liability rules by resorting to the kind of ad hoc, ex post

2655 (1994). The “grant of negative rights to prevent certain acts” is described as the
“fundamental feature of intellectual property protection” by the Panel Report, European
Communities, supra note 150, ¶ 7.210.
160. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 450–55 (1995) (noting that the theory
favoring property rules builds on the assumption that (1) transaction costs of market
exchange are low and (2) the candidates to the exchange are few, ideally just two, in such a
way that problems associated with strategic behavior (hold-outs, free riding) are minimized
or, even better, altogether avoided). Similar points had originally made by Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 159, at 1125, 1127.
161. See also Ullrich, supra note 8, at 410–11.
162. But the conclusion proposed in the text is far from settled. On the various
positions, see Dwyer, supra note 49, at 474–75, 535–36.
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measure discussed here. Similarly, even after having made the point
that a whole gamut of antitrust laws is TRIPs-compatible, one cannot
escape the conclusion that none of them can justify a per se prohibition
163
of a refusal to deal in IP.
2. Is IP an Essential Facility?
But then, what are the separate anti-competitive elements that
would make a prohibition of a refusal to deal in IP TRIPs-compliant?
This depends very much on which of the many acceptable varieties of
antitrust comes into play. The answers may vary greatly, depending on
the fundamental features of each legal system.
So, European competition law forbids refusal to deal only to the
extent that (1) there is a position of dominance in the market for which
the IP right gives protection in the first place, (2) the refusal has the
effect of preventing any competition in a new downstream market, and
164
(3) the refusal itself is not otherwise justified.
As far as TRIPs is concerned, the antitrust prohibition of a refusal to
deal in IP would appear to require, at a minimum, the finding of an
element of market power in the IP holder based on economic evidence
other than the legal monopoly granted by IP protection. Indeed, it is
well-settled that, while IP exclusive rights by definition give their
holders legal monopoly over the protected creation, their position, from
an economic standpoint, may well be subject to competition from one or
more substitutes. This is a most common occurrence, as shown by the
fact that the relevant legal systems usually do not even institute a prima
facie presumption that legal monopoly also entails economic market
165
power.
Therefore, if a Member’s antitrust laws forbade a refusal to
deal in IP on the sole basis of the legal monopoly granted by IP, even in
the absence of a finding of economic market power, such a rule would
once again transform property rule protected IP into entitlements
protected under a liability rule and, therefore, turn out to be
substantially equivalent to the one we found incompatible with TRIPs in
166
the previous paragraph.

163. See supra Part II.A.2.
164. See Case 4181/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co.
KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039.
165. For the E.U. system, see Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55. For the
U.S. system, see Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992).
166. However, the opposite view is expressed by Ullrich, supra note 8, at 407 n.24.
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In addition to a finding of economic dominance, is there a
behavioral element required by TRIPs before a refusal to deal in IP may
be forbidden by Members’ antitrust laws? Probably so, unless one is
prepared to argue that IP held by firms with market power may be
different from all other IP in that the former is protected under a
liability rule while the latter under a property rule. Such a proposition
would seem to run directly counter to TRIPs-mandated minimum
uniform standards of IP protection and would also be incompatible with
the wording of Article 8(2), which specifically allows for measures
167
intended to prevent “abuse” of IP.
If this may appear to be a strict rule, then we should consider that
this additional behavioral element may be satisfied under a quite large
number of different options. In the European Union, the behavioral
component is found in the presence of an abuse of dominant position
that is triggered when the refusal to deal by the IP holder amounts to an
exercise of exclusionary power in connection with a separate,
168
downstream market for which the IP asset is a necessary input. In the
United States, a finding of leverage into downstream markets or other
169
anti-competitive behavior is required by case law. These two formulas
might be further fleshed out by suggesting the appropriateness of
170
antitrust scrutiny in standards-dominated markets or in situations in
which a sector-specific IP is used to obtain disproportionate leverage in
171
vertical or complementary markets.
However, I would very much hesitate before concluding that these
approaches identify the outward boundaries of admissibility of antitrust
intervention in this context. Indeed, earlier it was noted that the
spectrum of TRIPs-compliant antitrust choices is wide; thus, I suggested
167. One way to read the position taken by Ullrich is that TRIPs allows for rules
concerning abuse even in absence of (absolute or relative) market power. Ullrich, supra note
8, at 407 n.24. This position would indeed escape the objection I raised earlier (and might
well be compatible with the position I developed on the varieties of antitrust supra Part
II.A.2).
168. See IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. at I-5039. For a thoughtful analysis of the prior line
of cases in this are, see MELI, supra note 109, at 106–23, 161–63, 203–42.
169. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
For a discussion of the rather intricate line of cases in this area, see ROBERT P. MERGES ET
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1018–24 (3d ed. 2003).
170. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 568–79 (2003).
171. See Robert P. Merges, Who Owns the Charles River Bridge? Intellectual Property
and Competition in the Software Industry (U.C. Berkeley Public Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 15, Nov. 1999), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
208089.
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that even different assessment criteria might turn out to be acceptable in
this perspective. Then, would a “fairness” standard be acceptable in this
area?
Probably, if one considers that fairness concerns have
traditionally been part and parcel of what we initially conceived as
antitrust goals, even though this approach ceased to be fashionable on
our shores maybe thirty or even forty years ago. And, this affirmative
conclusion should be reinforced if we take into account, as we should,
that a general principles-based approach to assess TRIPs-compatibility
is also supposed to incorporate into the analysis non-IP interests,
including a development component that may be far from irrelevant
when the issue of access to prior technology is at stake.
Again, this is not to say that what is TRIPs-compatible is also
appropriate and well-advised. Far from it. Indeed, there are several
difficulties that systematically arise any time antitrust scrutiny is applied
to the decision by an IP holder not to make his asset available to
interested third parties. First, antitrust is, as we earlier saw, a form of ex
post and ad hoc measure. It is enforced on a case-by-case basis by a
court or an administrative agency. While a regulatory agency may set in
advance a schedule of interconnection fees for the use of an essential
facility, such as a network, and do so on a principled basis that may
172
apply to a large number of different situations, antitrust-mandated
access to an IP asset is bound to be the outcome of a quite different
exercise, which is rooted in a two-party and adversarial context rather
than a regulatory context. This may be indispensable in some very
specific cases; however, it hardly makes for consistent and predictable
173
results.
Second, in the present legal environment, antitrust is either national
or regional, rather than international. IP assets subject to antitrust
scrutiny may be—or, rather, tend quite often to be—held by firms that
are nationals of a legal system that is different from the one to which the
relevant antitrust authority belongs. Thus, lack of predictability and
inconsistency over time may translate in international, even “political”
172. William J. Baumol, A ciascuno il tuo: concorrenza e servizio universale, 1
CONCORRENZA, MERCATO E REGOLE 65 (1999).
173. Now and then, the idea emerges that resorting to the patent misuse doctrine may
yield better results. See Merges, supra note 171, § 3.2.1. I agree, as the doctrine, implying the
lesser remedy of unenforceability of the IP rights, rather than full antitrust remedies, does not
require the kind of fact-intensive finding that is necessary for antitrust purposes. I would also
suggest carefully considering proposals to extend the misuse doctrine to copyright (following
the proposal by Chip Patterson, Copyright Misuse and Modified Copyleft: New Solutions to
the Challenges of Internet Standardization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1351 (2000)) and, especially, its
adoption by European courts.
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tensions.
In such a universe, identifying the additional behavioral component
by reference to fairness standards that are vague, open-ended, and
accordingly open to second-guessing of discriminatory motives may
exacerbate these difficulties. But it would appear that this risk makes
the standard unadvisable, rather than clearly TRIPs-incompatible.
Similar conclusions may be reached in assessing the feasibility of
applying what is generally termed essential facilities doctrine (EFD) to
issues of access to IP. EFD contemplates the possibility of granting
competitors access to a resource that is unique and cannot be duplicated
by enterprises in a market position comparable to the holder of the
facility. This possibility emerges when such access is indispensable for
competitors to operate in separate markets located downstream from
the resource itself. If this resource is an IP right, one is faced with the
same difficulties we encountered in connection with an outright refusal
to deal. This difficulty remains even in the cases in which all the
174
requirements for antitrust intervention are met. Because the holder is
found to have market power and to have engaged in the kind of
behavior that is deemed abusive, while TRIPs-compliance may be taken
for granted, the difficulty still remains in that the same access-granting
that is the everyday job of a regulatory body may turn out to be a
175
nightmare for an antitrust authority.
C. Regime Design Fine-Tuning
The above discussion should lead us to a final dimension. So far, it
has been possible to test, with specific reference to measures specifically
targeting restrictive behavior in international technology transfer and to
antitrust intervention, the choices available to Members incorporating
pro-competitive features into their IP legislation in ways that are TRIPscompliant.
We have seen that the options, even if not unlimited, are quite

174. See Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Television
Publ’n Ltd. v. EC Comm’n of the European Cmty., 1995 E.C.R. I-00743. The test appears
more restrictive in the United States. See David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F.
Supp. 728, 753 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that “a facility is essential under the antitrust laws
only when it is vital to both the plaintiff’s individual competitive viability and the viability of
the market in general” (emphasis added)).
175. One of the issues that is to be faced in this connection by antitrust authorities is
whether the remedy to refusal to deal and failure to give access to an essential facility may
consist in the imposition of an obligation to supply advance information on the IP holder in
the light of Article 39 of TRIPs. Ricolfi, supra note 146, at 171–72.
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extensive. However, we have also seen that a legislative exercise bent
on incorporating pro-competitive features through these two sorts of
measures is apt to face a number of difficulties that go beyond TRIPscompliance. On a number of occasions, we have come across the
shortcomings that usually are associated with ex post, ad hoc
intervention typical of antitrust and measures specifically targeting
restrictive behavior in international technology transfer. Earlier, we
had also seen that there seems to be more general reasons why
traditional antitrust law faces unprecedented difficulties in dealing with
176
the challenges posed by novel forms of IP protection.
Now, the time has come to explore whether any of these difficulties
may be remedied by resorting to forms of intervention other than ex
post, ad hoc measures, and if this may happen in a TRIPs-compliant
fashion. Thus, this Article will finally look at that form of generalized
ex ante intervention that was earlier indicated as regime design finetuning. In this connection, the specific issue of the availability of fair
use defenses with regard to software patents may prove particularly
instructive.
1. Software Patents and Fair Uses
It is well-known that digital innovation, initially protected under
177
copyright, is currently deemed to qualify for patent protection so far
the latter regimes’ access requirements are met. This conclusion has
been reached more or less simultaneously in the United States and in
178
Europe. In Europe, the persisting dualism between supranational
grant of patent rights and their domestic enforcement induced E.U.
authorities to propose a harmonization directive specifically dealing
179
with “computer implemented inventions.”
These parallel developments raised a number of questions,
176. See supra Part II.B.2.
177. Of course, the history of protection of computer programs is much longer and
more complicated than indicated in the stylized account supplied in the text. For the initial
resort to contract and trade secret protection in the United States prior to the 1976 Copyright
Act, see Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1493–95 (1997).
178. Compare State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Servs., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999), with In re Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 31 IIC 189
(2000).
179. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, COM (2002) 92 final (Feb.
20, 2002) (rejected by the European Parliament in second reading (June 6, 2005)) [hereinafter
Draft Directive].
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particularly in the area of exceptions to exclusivity.
This is so because software had come to be regarded as a special case
as far as fair use defenses to copyright protection are concerned.
Indeed, when E.U. Council Directive 91/250 was adopted to harmonize
181
software protection throughout Europe, it was felt that it was
necessary to give downstream program developers a guarantee as to
their freedom to decompile earlier programs and to make the former
182
interconnected and interoperable with the latter.
A broadly
equivalent outcome had earlier been reached in the United States by
183
courts rather than by legislative action. In either case, the availability
of specialized fair use defenses in the field of software was based on the
assumption that the preservation of a corresponding area of freedom is
a necessary incident of the special features of programs that, as a rule,
can be looked at as the building blocks of larger multi-component
products and quite often of networks, rather than discrete, self-sufficient
products.
Freedom of decompilation, interconnection and interoperability
proved in the meantime of crucial importance to the emergence and
successful operation of open-source software. The “wide galaxy,” which
is known under this label, resorts to a combination of copyright
protection and contract to make sure that source code is made available
to all recipients of open software and that no separate compensation is
requested for its use. Even so, open source still needs to interconnect
and be interoperable with dominant proprietary software in order to be
commercially viable. The availability of the specialized fair use defense
was essential to make these acts a form of admissible use, rather than
infringement of proprietary software.
Now, the superimposition of an additional, patent-based layer of
protection for computer programs is an elaborate but precarious
balancing exercise. This is so because an act that would have
180. For a concise treatment, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Examining State Street
Bank:
Developments in Business Method Patenting, in COMPUTER UND RECHT
INTERNATIONAL 1 (2001), and Alex Clellan, Novelty, Inventive Step and ComputerImplemented Inventions, in I BREVETTI PER INVENZIONE FRA DIRITTO EUROPEO E DIRITTO
NAZIONALE 61 (Marco Ricolfi ed., 2004).
181. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L122) 42 (EC) (providing legal
protection for computer programs).
182. See id. arts. 1(2), 5, 6, 9.
183. For a comparative account of the solutions adopted in the United States and the
European Union, see Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPs on the Information Superhighway:
International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 VILL.
L. REV. 207, 232–52 (1996).
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constituted a fair use under software-adapted copyright law may or may
not be covered by what in U.S. and E.U. patent laws is known as
experimental use defense or research exemption. Depending on the
legal system and court, there is remarkably varying latitude given to this
184
defense. Thus, the use may constitute a patent infringement as soon
as the downstream product is marketed, even in situations in which
under copyright law interoperability and interconnection defenses
would be available.
This is the reason why it was felt by the drafters of the now defunct
E.U. Draft Directive that downstream program producers should enjoy
a broader, sector-specific exception even in connection with patent law.
This belief mirrors the corresponding specialized fair use defenses
available under copyright law. This is an interesting concept that
deserves being closely analyzed, even though the legislative initiative
that adopted it has in the meantime been killed. I have argued
elsewhere that the language proposed in the Draft Directive was not apt
185
to reach the intended outcome.
However, before dealing with the
issue of language adequacy, we should ask whether a sector-specific
exception to patent rights that intended to carve out of patent
exclusivity a perimeter of freedom tailored to the specific needs of
downstream innovators in a given industry would be in compliance with
Articles 27 and 30 of TRIPs in the first place.
Admittedly, this is not an easy question, but one that, on balance,
should be answered in the affirmative.
In this specific context, the assessment of TRIPs-compliance has to
be made in the light of the provisions of both Articles 27 and 30 because
the latter provision is specifically devoted to laying down the
requirements that are to be met if an exception to patent exclusivity is
to be deemed acceptable. For its part, the former provision directly
impacts on the admissible scope of limitations and exceptions by
forbidding “discrimination as to . . . the field of technology” in
connection with the scope of patent protection, which is the reverse of
186
provisions regarding exceptions and limitations.
184. For a comparative treatment of the scope of experimental use defense and
research exemption in Europe and the United States, see DAVID GILAT, EXPERIMENTAL
USE AND PATENTS (1995), and Sven J. R. Bostyn, One Patent a Day Keeps the Doctor Away?
Patenting Human Genetic Information and Health Care, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 229, 248–49
(2000).
185. For a discussion of the issue and the text of a suggested provision to cure its
inadequacies, see Ricolfi, supra note 146, 166–69 n.79.
186. Draft Directive, supra note 179, at 18.
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Because all of the three requirements under Article 30 have to be
met before an exception or limitation to patent rights is to be deemed
TRIPs-compatible, we may as well start by looking at them before
turning to the technology-discrimination issue arising under Article 27.
Article 30 deals with “Exceptions to Rights Conferred” and
provides: “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that these exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
187
into account the legitimate interests of third parties.” Thus, the first
requirement is that the exception is limited. It is commonly understood
that to establish whether an exception is limited, one must resort to a
criterion that is normative, rather than economic, because the
assessment specifically concerning economic impact is dealt with under
188
the second and third requirement.
In this connection, it should be noted that patentee’s exclusivity over
making, using and selling the patented device is not directly curtailed by
the freedom to decompile and, possibly, to interconnect.
Freedom to decompile a patent-protected computer program, in so
far as it amounts to the reverse-engineering of a product for purposes of
observation or study and trial within a laboratory or experimental
context (which can be assimilated to a laboratory), does not exceed the
well-known exception to patent exclusivity described as experimental
use or research exemption. While not uniformly adopted by all legal
189
systems, this exemption certainly is deemed TRIPs-compliant.
Also, the extension to the patent field of freedom of
interconnection, as guaranteed in the copyright context by provisions,
should not generate problems of TRIPs-compatibility. For instance,
Article 1(2) of Council Directive 250/91 expressly rules out the
protectability of ideas and principles underlying the interfaces. In fact,
interfaces normally consist of sequences of code that usually are not
even included in the patent specification and may be written well after
190
the filing.
Accordingly, rules that provide for freedom of
interconnection, rather than excluding interfaces that are patentable
187. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30 (emphasis added).
188. See Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶¶ 7.31, 7.32. For a similar discussion
in connection with Article 17, dealing with exceptions to trademark rights, see Panel Report,
European Communities, supra note 150, ¶¶ 7.649, 7.651.
189. See Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.69.
190. See Giovanni Guglielmetti, La Proposta Di Direttiva Sulla Brevettazione Delle
Invenzioni In Materia Di Software, 50 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE 438, 461–62 (2002).
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191

subject matter, should be deemed a “limited” exception within the
meaning of Article 30.
The issue may be less straightforward when assessing the TRIPscompatibility of freedom to use information obtained through
decompilation and intended to achieve interoperability of a subsequent
independently created computer program with a prior patented
program. Again, one should consider that later interoperable programs
normally are complements rather than substitutes to the initial software,
and that exclusivity over making, selling and using a patented product
does not necessarily and, perhaps not even typically, entail exclusivity
over complementary items. If this is so, then even freedom of
interoperability could conceivably be tailored in such a way as not to go
beyond a limited exception to the exclusive rights.
Turning to the second and third requirements, we should keep in
mind that, as earlier indicated, the corresponding tests have an
economic component. Here, what should be asked to make sure that
the exception does “not unreasonably conflict with a normal
192
exploitation of the patent” is whether the limitation would have a
significant negative economic impact on the market position that patent
laws intend to bestow on a patentee. Similarly, the question raised by
the third requirement is whether the limitation would lead to a
prejudice of patentee’s legitimate interests to reap the rewards
envisaged by the legal system in conferring by patent rights. It has been
remarked that while the test as a whole may imply an economic
assessment, the concept of normalcy is based on a notion that is
193
normative rather than empirical. I agree. Both tests are economicsbased in that they compare the situation in which the patentee finds
herself when the exception applies with the hypothetical situation that
would prevail when no exception was available. However, this latter
hypothesis is based on a normative idea that the appropriate scope of
protection should commensurate with the rationale of the grant. This
approach seems to be especially clear because a reasonableness test is
resorted to in both cases.
If this is the appropriate approach, then to establish whether specific

191. On the different status as TRIPs-compliance of subject matter exclusion as
opposed to what is indicated as exemptions (and referred to in this text as exceptions and
limitations), see the thoughtful comments of Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 434–43.
192. Id.
193. A similar point is made in Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.69, and in
Panel Report, European Communities, supra note 150, ¶ 7.633.
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exceptions for software patents, such as the specialized fair uses we
earlier discussed, are acceptable, we should take into account that, while
classical patent laws provided for protection of individual components,
they did so on the implicit assumption that the market was based on a
number of competing multi-component products. Thus, a patent over a
new brake for vehicles would not be likely to translate into a monopoly
over cars because brand A car furnished with the patented brake would
still be in competition with cars of brand B, C, etc. On the contrary, in
digital markets, the existence of competitive multi-component products
is not to be taken for granted. In some cases, a number of alternative
platforms compete against each other (as it happens in connection with
mobile phones and videogame consoles), in others there is only one
single platform that is not subject to any competition (as it happens in
connection with the Internet). This is hardly surprising. Some
economists suggest that in digital markets, network externalities tend to
transform competition in the market into competition for the market:
194
winner takes all.
If we consider that, as noted earlier, programs as a rule are the
building blocks of larger multi-component products, such as platforms
or even networks, the questions implicit in the last two requirements are
whether it is normal for patentee to have a chance to extend her
monopoly from a single component to a platform and whether the same
patentee does have a legitimate expectation to do so. This is a
particularly troubling question, considering that, in the digital economy,
competing platforms may lack or, if present, be liable to come to an end
as a result of “tipping.” In a different setting, it has been decided that it
is not normal for patentees to extend their monopoly beyond the term
of protection—even if they originally had to wait for some supervisory
approval before having the green light to initially market the patented
product—and that they do not have a legitimate expectation to recoup
195
their waiting period through such a term extension. I submit that the
same conclusion should apply to the extension of monopoly from a
single component to the multi-component product that incorporates the
component. This conclusion seems particularly appropriate in those
technological fields in which the danger of disproportionate leverage
has been clearly established.
Thus, freedoms of decompilation,
interconnection and interoperability in the field of software patents do

194. For a discussion of this issue, see Note, Antitrust and the Information Age: Section
2 Monopolization Analyses in the New Economy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1623, 1634–36 (2001).
195. Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶¶ 7.61, 7.82.
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not run afoul of the mandate of Article 30 of TRIPs.
This is particularly so if we take into account, as required by the final
196
part of Article 30, “the legitimate interests of third parties.” It is easy
to connect this normative proposition to the general principles-based
analysis we conducted above and come to the conclusion that the third
parties’ interests that are to be taken into account herein are precisely
197
the interests of current users and of new generations of innovators.
Indeed, current users may be prejudiced if the upstream monopoly is
allowed to be leveraged downstream. Downstream innovators are at
the mercy of incumbents if they are not allowed freedom of
decompilation, interconnection and interoperability. In turn, this
translates into a clear danger for the long-term efficiency of the global
innovation system; the avoidance of which is clearly favored by TRIPs
general principles.
It appears remarkable in this case that pro-competitive concerns can
be incorporated into the assessment of TRIPs-compatibility as a matter
of course because the wording itself of Article 30 expressly refers to the
“legitimate interests of third parties.” However, I submit that a similar
approach should be followed even if this specific wording were not
available, because the corresponding guideline is generalized through
reference in Article 7 of TRIPs to “the mutual advantage of producers
and users of a technological knowledge” and to the favor for IP
protection modes shaped “in a manner conducive to . . . a balance of
198
rights and obligations.” Therefore, the final words of Article 30 must
be read as making explicit what is implicit in the overall architecture of
TRIPs.
On the other hand, it might be argued that the interests of current
users and downstream innovators might be taken into account if we
were to test the TRIPs-compliance of an antitrust scrutiny of a refusal to
deal by a software patent holder that denies access to his invention to
199
programmers of complementary products. Therefore, it would appear
inconsistent if Members were allowed to take into account those
interests in connection with ex post, ad hoc interventions on IP but were
not allowed to do so in connection with generalized ex ante measures.
Probably, this kind of argument may have a grain of truth to it; however,
I would be reluctant to make too much of it for reasons that I will
196.
197.
198.
199.

TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30.
See supra Part I.B.4.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part I.B.1.
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discuss in item (3) of the Conclusion. I argue that an antitrust remedy
to refusal to deal in IP is based on an individualized finding of anticompetitive behavior, and that there is no way to make a generalized
assumption that failure to assent to decompilation, interconnection and
interoperability amount per se to abusive behavior. Thus, the parallel
to antitrust cannot carry, by itself, decisive weight, even though it may
corroborate the outcome reached on other grounds and on the basis of
an analysis of Article 30.
It seems to me that this line of argument also disposes of the
objections that might be raised on the basis of the mandate of
technological neutrality under Article 27 of TRIPs. Indeed, targeted
exemptions, as the ones I just discussed, may be based on important
national public policies declared relevant under Article 8(1). If this is
the case, the fact that some sectors are singled-out as of “vital
importance” for national policies under Article 8(1) by definition
implies that the measure based on this same provision may operate
selectively rather than across-the-board. This is so because a TRIPs
general principles-based interpretation of Article 27(1) may not
altogether negate Article 8(1), and vice versa. After all, as shown
above, “Art. 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with
200
problems that may exist only in certain product areas.”
Moreover,
nothing would prevent Members to resort to ex post antitrust scrutiny of
behavior of IP holders intended to use a sector-specific IP right to
leverage a vertical or complementary market. Thus, it may be argued
once again, if only to corroborate this conclusion, Article 27 may not be
an obstacle to Members’ choice to pursue the goal of keeping vertical or
complementary markets open to competition by means of an ex ante,
generalized measure, such as a targeted exception.
So, sector-specific exceptions for software patents would be TRIPscompliant. This conclusion may sound a bit anti-climatic at the present
time, considering that the E.U. Draft Directive on software patents was
just defeated. I do not think this is the case.
First, because, as indicated above, thousands of software patents are
being currently granted in Europe and will continue to be granted in the
future notwithstanding the rejection of the proposed Draft Directive. In
this context, the introduction of an exception to patent exclusivity
mirroring the specialized fair uses available in connection with copyright
protected software is probably a necessity, and at a minimum, very

200. See Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.92.
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advisable. And, as I am afraid that European courts are likely to prove
quite hesitant in this regard, it appears appropriate for the E.U.
Commission to step in, while relinquishing the rest of the rejected Draft
Directive, and to restart the whole legislative process in order to
introduce this one bit of legislation.
Second, because the exception we have been discussing is a nice case
of what the Article called regime design fine-tuning, it has a few more
general lessons we might be interested in learning. This is what this
Article shall try to do in the following concluding remarks.
CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
This Article dealt with the software patent specific exception as a
case of regime design fine-tuning. This seems to make sense when
applying the criteria proposed earlier. This kind of measure would work
ex ante rather than ex post, because it consists of a rule that provides
advance notice of the classes of behavior that remain open to third
parties even in the absence of consent by patentees. Moreover, the rule
is self-enforcing because it does not require any further intervention by
a State authority to achieve its purpose. At the same time, this same
rule is generalized because it applies to all third parties—and to all
patentees—who find themselves in a pre-determined situation; that is,
they are engaged in decompiling, interconnecting or making and selling
interoperable programs that interfere with patented software.
However, this is not an ad hoc measure because the conclusion is not
rooted in a particularized two-party and adversarial set of
circumstances. Finally, the re-balancing undertaken is “interstitial”
because it does not seem apt to upset the basic rationale for this kind of
protection.
This kind of fine-tuning exercise can be undertaken by willing
Members in a quite large number of akin situations. In a prior study, I
201
have looked at two additional study cases of regime design fine-tuning.
One deals with what is called “regulatory review exception” in
connection with generic versions of patented drugs. This exception
concerns the opportunity for generic competitors to initiate clinical
trials and testing before expiration of the controlling patent to obtain
marketing approval effective after the term of protection. The other
exception deals with access requirements in the field of biotechnological

201. See Ricolfi, supra note 146, at 163–66. In connection with this area, see Panel
Report, Canada, supra note 149.
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patents: the requirement of industrial application, that is, the European
equivalent to what in the United States conceptualizes as utility. This
field may be fine-tuned in a TRIPs-compliant way in order to make sure
that the scope of protection does not unduly block further research.
Of course, this is only just a beginning. Members, if willing, may
engage in many additional exercises in fine-tuning. As indicated earlier,
Members are likely to have good reasons to do so. As far as developing
202
Members are concerned, the incentive should be pretty clear by now.
Even the United States, Europe, Japan and other industrialized
countries should have sufficient grounds to start working in this
direction to ensure that the engine of innovation does not grind to a
203
halt, particularly if we believe that current innovation-oriented
competition policy is insufficient to guarantee the degree of competitive
204
openness likely to be required in innovation markets.
Of course, the crucial task for Members interested in engaging in
this exercise is to make sure that in doing so they respect the mandate of
TRIPs-compatibility. It is quite likely that appropriate criteria to make
this sort of assessment will eventually emerge on the basis of a sufficient
number of test cases. However, it would appear that, on the basis of the
findings accumulated thus far, we may already be in a position to make
a few preliminary remarks.
Indeed, it is time to come back from the specific perspective of
regime design to the question whether and to what extent the
interpretation and application of TRIPs norms, particularly those that
are necessary for TRIPs-consistency, is impacted by consideration of
pro-competitive concerns either admitted or actively encouraged by
TRIPs itself.
In this connection, a few remarks seem appropriate:
(1) Consideration of the legitimate interests of third parties
expressly referred to in Article 30 to assess whether the admissibility of
an exception to patent exclusivity can and should be generalized in the
evaluation of TRIPs-compliance of other exceptions as well as of other
features of regime design, such as access requirements and scope of
protection. This is so because consideration of non-IP interests, such as
access claims to IP staked by current users and future generations of
innovators, is explicitly suggested by general principles analysis. For
202. See supra Part II.B.1.
203. In a similar vein, see Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 432, 447–48. The
authors advocate greater fluidity in reading TRIPs in view of preserving the public domain.
204. See supra Part II.B.2.
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instance, Article 7 of TRIPs references “the mutual advantage of
producers and users of a technological knowledge” and the favor for IP
protection modes shaped “in a manner conducive to . . . a balance of
205
rights and obligations.”
For the purpose of establishing what is the net outcome of
protection that is non-negotiable, a modicum of balancing between IPand non-IP interests is allowed under a TRIPs general principles-based
interpretation. In this regard, one should also take into account that
TRIPs in the area at the intersection between IP and competition builds
on an architecture based on authorization plus reticence, which suggests
that Members can retain a sufficient amount of flexibility required for
that balancing act without necessarily violating mandatory minimum
standards.
(2) Another contribution towards clarification of the issue of TRIPscompliance can be derived from the discussion of the mandate of
technological neutrality under Article 27(1) that has cropped-up in
connection with both local working requirements and software patents.
In this connection, it has appeared that even a technology-specific
feature of regime design might be reconciled with the principle of
technological neutrality under a general principles-based interpretation.
This approach suggests that when problems exist only in certain product
areas, and these involve important national public policies under Article
8(1), even measures or rules operating selectively may be TRIPscompliant.
(3) What would have much more far-reaching consequences would
be the possibility of arguing for a sort of “equivalency” of antitrust
intervention and regime design fine-tuning. One could indeed make the
case that Members have the option of exerting the powers they retain at
the intersection between IP and competition either through antitrust
measures or by regime design fine-tuning. In doing so, they have a
choice as to the kind of measure from time to time selected. Therefore,
whatever outcome may be reached through ex post antitrust
intervention can also be obtained by ex ante and generalized rules
concerning access requirements, scope of protection, exceptions and the
like.
If this approach were acceptable, it would support some kind of
“strong form” equivalency between different pro-competitive measures
allowed for by TRIPs, the consequences of which would be rather

205. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7 (emphasis added).
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sweeping. Indeed, we have had a chance to look at the remarkably wide
extent of flexibility retained by Members at the intersection of
206
We have also argued that this flexibility is
competition and IP.
207
enhanced rather than restricted by TRIPs general principles analysis.
Further, we concluded that the spectrum of TRIPs-compliant models
that can be adopted in the field of classical competition or antitrust law
208
is very broad. In terms of practical impact, strong form equivalency
would mean that one should not worry too much if classic competition
law has in the meantime become obsolete, because what was lost in
terms of antitrust may entirely be regained by recycling it through a
well-tempered, fine-tuning exercise.
However, it is doubtful whether one can make this kind of argument
because ex ante and generalized measures are not perfect equivalents to
ex post and ad hoc measures for purposes of TRIPs-compliance. In
some regards, the former may be preferable to the latter even in terms
of furthering TRIPs-specific goals, such as predictability of outcomes
and non-discrimination among IP holders of different nationalities, for
209
the reasons discussed earlier.
On the other hand, as hinted in the
previous paragraph, one cannot disregard the fact that the legitimacy of
ex post and ad hoc measures is rooted in a two-party, adversarial
context. In antitrust, the intervention is legitimate insofar as it is a
reaction to specific behavior that may be considered either restrictive
(for bilateral behavior) or abusive (for unilateral behavior) under factintensive circumstances as established through a finding by a decisionmaking authority. Ex ante generalized rules are different; they are
automatic consequences of a legally typical set of circumstances rather
than a remedy to unlawful behavior. Accordingly, unlawful behavior
cannot be assumed as typical without fact-finding by a specific authority
in an adversarial context. After all, this is the kind of reasoning that
earlier induced us to conclude that there cannot be a remedy against a
refusal to deal in IP unless specific evidence of additional and separate
210
anti-competitive behavior is found.
Therefore, it would seem that there may be cases in which TRIPs
enables Members to further pro-competitive concerns only through one
form of intervention—antitrust—even though it does not allow for the

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part I. B.3–4.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Parts I.B.4., III.C.1.
See supra Part III.B.1.
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generalization of this measure by the adoption of an ex ante rule. The
latter would dispense from the finding of specific inadmissible behavior
by the competent authority.
This does not amount to saying that pro-competitive concerns are
relevant only for purposes of antitrust intervention and for the
assessment of their TRIPs-compatibility. Far from it. On the contrary,
a general principles-based analysis helps highlight the extent in which
this horizontal, pro-competitive feature of TRIPs is relevant to the
assessment of measures targeting restrictive behavior in international
transfer of technology and regime design fine-tuning. The point I am
making is that this same horizontal feature has its own limits. Some
kind of intervention may be based on specific requirements that must be
established in ways that cannot possibly be replicated in connection with
different forms of measures or intervention. Thus, it would seem that
what I earlier called “equivalency” can be adopted only in its weak
form. This weak form accepts the generalized relevance of procompetitive goals in the interpretation and application of all TRIPs
provisions yet insists that careful case-by-case analysis is required before
we may conclude that Members are, in a given context, enabled to use
tools different from antitrust to pursue objectives that TRIPs authorizes
only in specific connection with classic antitrust intervention.
This approach is probably apt to lead Members that might wish to
counter IP protectionist tendencies only half-way in their effort. Thus,
if one is to respond to the question that forms the title of this Article,
then the response is likely to be in the negative. The conclusions
reached here cannot in any plausible way be described as a complete
remedy to IP overprotection. Nevertheless, if Members decided to take
advantage of the significant fluidity that TRIPs enables, it would still be
a very welcome result indeed.

